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I. INTRODUCTION 
The role of the federal courts in immigration law is very limited. 
The plenary power doctrine, developed in the nineteenth century, 
promotes an extremely deferential, “hands off” approach by the 
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judiciary. Under the doctrine, congressional power over immigration 
law is plenary. In exercising this plenary power, Congress gets to 
legislate in ways that would be wholly unacceptable in other 
contexts. For example, the Supreme Court has explained that when it 
comes to immigration, Congress may dictate what due process is for 
certain foreign nationals.1 There is an ongoing debate about the 
current strength of the plenary power doctrine.2 However, even as the 
 
 1. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953) (“Courts have 
long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute 
exercised by the Government's political departments largely immune from judicial control.”); 
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (“Whatever the 
procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is 
concerned.”); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893) (“The right of a nation 
to expel or deport foreigners who have not been naturalized, or taken any steps towards 
becoming citizens of the country, rests upon the same grounds, and is as absolute and 
unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entrance into the country.”); Ekiu v. U.S., 
142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892) (“It is not within the province of the judiciary to order that foreigners 
who have never been naturalized, nor acquired any domicile or residence within the United 
States, nor even been admitted into the country pursuant to law, shall be permitted to enter, in 
opposition to the constitutional and lawful measures of the legislative and executive branches of 
the national government. As to such persons, the decisions of executive or administrative 
officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by Congress, are due process of law.”); Chae 
Chan Ping (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (describing as legislative 
prerogative the power to exclude “foreigners of a different race . . . who will not assimilate with 
us” and describing decisions exercised under that prerogative as “conclusive upon the 
judiciary”). 
 2. See, e.g., STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND 
POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA 177–222 (1987) [hereinafter IMMIGRATION AND THE 
JUDICIARY]; T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power: The Meaning and Impact of 
Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365 (2002); Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary 
Power Doctrine? A Tentative Apology and Prediction for Our Strange but Unexceptional 
Constitutional Immigration Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257 (2000); Gabriel J. Chin, 
Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of 
Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1998) [hereinafter Segregation’s Last Stronghold]; Stephen 
H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. 
CT. REV. 255; Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, 
Congress, and the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 925 (1995) [hereinafter Ten More Years 
of Plenary Power]; Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural 
Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625 (1992) [hereinafter 
The Curious Evolution]; Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law after a Century of Plenary 
Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990) 
[hereinafter Immigration Law after a Century of Plenary Power]; Michele R. Pistone, A Times 
Sensitive Response to Professor Aleinikoff’s Detaining Plenary Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
391 (2002); Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1 
(1984); Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 339 (2002); 
Margaret H. Taylor, Detained Aliens Challenging Conditions of Confinement and the Porous 
Border of the Plenary Power Doctrine, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1087 (1995). 
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plenary power doctrine shows its age and is arguably somewhat 
weakened, federal courts today face complicated and broad 
immigration jurisdiction-stripping statutes that limit their power to 
review immigration administrative action.3 Thus, the role of the 
federal courts in immigration law remains quite limited.  
The restricted role of the federal courts has implications for both 
individual litigation and collective action, as the plenary power 
doctrine and the statutory limits affect all types of immigration 
litigation. The implications of the narrow role of the federal courts 
certainly have not escaped scholarly attention. For example, the 
history, strength, merits, and future of the plenary power doctrine are 
the objects of important scholarship.4 The merits and meaning of the 
jurisdiction-stripping statutes have also received diligent scholarly 
attention.5 But most of this scholarship focuses on the role of the 
federal courts from the perspective of individual litigation. This 
Article opts for the collective approach; it focuses on the future of the 
immigration class action in light of the very limited role of the federal 
courts in immigration law.6  
 
 3. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2000). 
 4. See supra note 2. 
 5. See, e.g., Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial 
Review of Immigration Proceedings, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1411 (1997); Lenni B. Benson, The 
New World of Judicial Review of Removal Orders, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 233 (1998); Daniel 
Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discretion and Deference in U.S. 
Immigration Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 703 (1997); Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the 
War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 369 (2006); Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear and 
Loathing in Congress and the Courts: Immigration and Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1615 
(2000); M. Isabel Medina, Judicial Review—A Nice Thing? Article III, Separation of Powers 
and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L. 
REV. 1525 (1997); Nancy Morawetz, Back to Back to the Future? Lessons Learned from 
Litigation over the 1996 Restrictions on Judicial Review, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 113 (2006–
2007); Hiroshi Motomura, Judicial Review in Immigration Cases After AADC: Lessons from 
Civil Procedure, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 385 (2000); Gerald L. Neuman, Jurisdiction and the 
Rule of Law After the 1996 Immigration Act, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1963 (2000); and Leti Volpp, 
Court-Stripping and Class-Wide Relief: A Response to Judicial Review in Immigration Cases 
After AADC, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 463 (2000). 
 6. Scholars have discussed the immigration class action as a part of larger works. See, 
e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, International Human Rights Class Actions: New Frontiers for Group 
Litigation, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 643, 653 (2004); David A. Martin, Behind the Scenes on a 
Different Set: What Congress Needs to Do in the Aftermath of St. Cyr and Nguyen, 16 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 313, 321–23 (2002); Motomura, supra note 5, at 434–39; Gerald L. Neuman, 
Federal Courts Issues in Immigration Law, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1661, 1679–87 (2000); Robert 
Pauw, Judicial Review of “Pattern and Practice” Cases: What to Do When the INS Acts 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 71 Family book pages.doc  8/12/2008 3:56:00 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
74 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 27:71 
 
 
This Article identifies and discusses three threats to the future of 
the immigration class action: (1) a general congressional willingness 
to restrict immigration judicial review; (2) the application of waivers 
of judicial review to immigration law; and (3) legislative jurisdiction-
stripping attacks more specific to the immigration class action. This 
Article will focus on the implications of these threats for class 
litigation while recognizing that these threats may also be hostile to 
individual litigation. For example, the general congressional 
willingness to restrict the role of courts in immigration law affects 
individual action but also has implications for class actions. When 
jurisdiction over a type of individual action is eliminated, those 
individuals have no action to bring collectively. Additionally, a 
congressional attitude hostile to immigration judicial review 
generally sets the atmosphere within which Congress considers 
legislative proposals that would restrict the use of the class action 
specifically. This atmosphere is also conducive to proposals to 
require judicial review waivers as a condition of obtaining an 
immigration benefit (which affect collective action as well as 
individual action).  
These threats imperil a form of action that litigants have used to 
challenge government administration of immigration laws.7 
Consistent across these actions are allegations of unlawful 
government behavior with widespread effect.8 These actions carry the 
promise of broad systematic reform and the potential to bring relief to 
those who may not know they are entitled to it, or to those who may 
 
Unlawfully, 70 WASH. L. REV. 779, 790–98 (1995); Peter H. Schuck & Theodore Hsien Wang, 
Continuity and Change: Patterns of Immigration Litigation in the Courts, 1979–1990, 45 STAN. 
L. REV. 115, 145–60 (1992); Volpp, supra note 5, at 467–71. 
 7. Part II lists examples of different types of allegations brought via an immigration class 
action complaint. The Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse at Washington University in St. 
Louis School of Law is engaged in a groundbreaking project to add immigration class actions to 
its database of civil rights cases. For more information about the Clearinghouse and its 
developing collection of immigration class action cases, see http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/ (last 
visited Feb. 6, 2008). 
 8. See, e.g., McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., 498 U.S. 479 (1991) (holding federal 
district court had jurisdiction over a class action challenging administration of the 1986 
legalization program); Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) 
(affirming district court’s class-wide injunction to the extent that it ordered the immigration 
service to change its procedures in processing asylum applications). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol27/iss1/5
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know but lack the resources to mount a challenge.9 Also, as the 
Supreme Court has observed, it may be impossible to challenge an 
immigration pattern or practice in the context of an individual 
hearing.10 
This identification of threats exposes patterns of attack against the 
immigration class action. At the same time, it exposes an immigration 
front in the broad war against the class action. It does so not only by 
focusing attention on the fate of the immigration class action 
generally, but also by initiating a specific discussion about the threat 
presented by judicial review waivers, including the collective action 
waiver, to immigration class actions. The government has argued that 
these immigration waivers are not subject to the Constitution.11 This 
Article critiques this assertion. The identification of threats here and 
the focus on collective action is a call for further thought about what 
would be lost if the immigration class action disappeared.12 It reveals 
a need to know more about immigration class actions in practice and 
to learn more about a form of immigration litigation that is under 
attack.13  
 
 9. See Neuman, supra note 6, at 1680–81; Volpp, supra note 5, at 468–71; Motomura, 
supra note 5, at 390–91. 
 10. McNary, 498 U.S. at 496–97. See also Motomura, supra note 5, at 389–90; Pauw, 
supra note 6, at 794–96. 
 11. See infra note 162. 
 12. Immigration class actions have undoubtedly led to changed government behavior in 
administering the immigration laws; but there are many unanswered questions. For example, a 
question ripe for exploration is whether past immigration class actions could have achieved the 
same results as individual actions. Recent groundbreaking immigration cases were not brought 
as class actions. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 
289 (2001). 
 13. In their important and influential study, Peter Schuck and Theodore Wang examined 
the changing patterns of immigration litigation in the 1980s by analyzing immigration cases 
reported on Westlaw and Lexis during the years 1979, 1985, 1989 and 1990. Schuck & Wang, 
supra note 6. The study identifies and discusses a category of “affirmative challenges,” which 
the study defines as “cases initiated by aliens, labor unions, or others seeking to directly 
challenge governmental policies or practices.” Id. at 121. For this category of immigration 
cases, the study discusses case volumes in various circuits, goals of the challenges, issues in 
contention in those cases, grounds upon which the challenges are based, success rates of the 
claims, and distinguishes between impact and other types of affirmative immigration litigation. 
Id. at 121, 145–60.  
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II. THE IMMIGRATION CLASS ACTION 
Litigants have used the class action format to challenge 
government behavior in a variety of immigration law contexts. For 
example, named plaintiffs have sued on behalf of a class of similarly 
situated foreign nationals challenging the administration of an 
immigration benefit program.14 Others have used the class action 
format to challenge a procedure or practice used in removing foreign 
nationals from the United States.15  
Examples of challenges to benefit programs include several class 
action lawsuits confronting the administration of the 1986 
legalization program.16 In general, these lawsuits claimed that, in 
administering the legalization program, the immigration service 
excluded individuals from the program whom Congress intended to 
include, either by instituting faulty regulations or by employing 
procedures that rendered the application process constitutionally 
infirm. The class of plaintiffs belonging to McNary v. Haitian 
Refugee Center, Inc. alleged that the immigration service used 
constitutionally flawed procedures during the legalization application 
 
 14. See infra notes 16–28. 
 15. See infra notes 29–32. There is another scenario that could give rise to an immigration 
class action. A class may challenge a state or federal law that regulates foreign nationals in the 
United States unrelated to immigration status. So-called alienage actions concern how foreign 
nationals are treated in the United States in non-immigration contexts. See, e.g. , Plyler v. Doe, 
457 U.S. 202 (1982) (class action comprised of foreign national children denied access to Texas 
public schools); Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982) (class action challenging state university 
practice of denying foreign nationals in-state tuition rates); Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647 
(1978) (class action challenging state university practice of denying foreign nationals in-state 
tuition rates); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (class action challenging restrictive state 
policy of hiring only U.S. citizen police officers); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (class 
action challenging Social Security eligibility rules); Hampton v. Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) 
(class action challenging federal service employment restrictions to U.S. citizens); Hurtado v. 
U.S., 410 U.S. 578 (1973) (class action challenging material witness compensation scheme as 
applied to foreign nationals); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (class action 
challenging state civil service law restricting certain positions to U.S. citizens); Graham v. 
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (class action challenging state welfare laws as applied to 
foreign nationals). This Article focuses on class actions tied more directly to immigration status 
(either the granting of or taking away). 
 16. See, e.g., Reno v. Catholic Soc. Serv., Inc., 509 U.S. 43 (1993); McNary, 498 U.S. 479; 
Aparicio v. Blakeway, 302 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2002); Immigrant Assistance Project of the L.A. 
County Fed’n of Labor v. I.N.S., 306 F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 2002); Proyecto San Pablo v. I.N.S., 189 
F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 1999); Abdullah v. I.N.S., 184 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 1999); Naranjo-Aguilera v. 
I.N.S., 30 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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process.17 The class argued that because the service did not allow 
applicants to challenge adverse evidence, denied applicants the 
opportunity to present witnesses, failed to provide competent 
interpreters, and failed to provide verbatim recording of interviews, 
the procedure foreclosed meaningful administrative review.18 
Litigants have used the class action format to challenge the 
government’s administration of immigration benefits outside of the 
legalization context.19 Class action litigation has also targeted the 
government’s administration of asylum laws.20 In response to one 
class action, Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, the Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit, in 1982, upheld a class-wide injunction that 
ordered the immigration service to reprocess asylum applications in a 
manner consistent with due process.21 A more recent class action, 
Ngwanyia v. Ashcroft, challenged the government’s procedures in 
adjusting the immigration status of those granted asylum to legal 
 
 17. McNary, 498 U.S. at 487–88. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See, e.g., Gonzales v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 239 F.R.D. 620 (W.D. Wash. 
2006) (certifying class challenging administration of an inadmissibility waiver); Santillan v. 
Gonzales, 388 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (granting summary judgment to class 
challenging delays in issuing evidence of permanent resident status to those granted that status 
in immigration court); Campos v. I.N.S., 32 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (denying in part 
a motion to dismiss class claims challenging the administration of medical waivers as a part of 
the naturalization process). 
 20. See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir. 1992) (ordering 
district court to dismiss class action complaint challenging interdiction at sea procedures); 
Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (affirming district court’s 
class-wide injunction to the extent it ordered the immigration service to reprocess asylum 
applications); Jeanty v. Bulger, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1373–74 (S.D. Fla. 2002), aff'd sub nom., 
Moise v. Bulger, 321 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (denying motion to certify habeas 
class of Haitian refugees); Wang v. Reno, 862 F. Supp. 801, 811 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (declining to 
create habeas class of foreign nationals challenging asylum decisions because, among other 
things, too many individual issues were present); Am. Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. 
Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (approving settlement agreement between class of Salvadoran and 
Guatemalan asylum seekers and the government providing for de novo asylum adjudication); 
Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (certifying provisional class of 
Salvadorans challenging asylum practices).  
 21. Smith, 676 F.2d at 1040–41. In response to a surge of asylum applications, the 
immigration service implemented an accelerated processing program. Administrative judges 
held eighteen individual hearings per day and provided short time frames for applicants to 
compile their claims. Due to the speed, there was a shortage of attorneys available to those 
applicants who desired counsel. During the accelerated program, the immigration service did 
not grant asylum to any applicants. Id. at 1029–32. 
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permanent resident.22 The complaint alleged that the government was 
under-using the number of asylee adjustments permitted per year.23 
The lawsuit settled with the government committing to distribute a 
minimum number of adjustments of status to legal permanent 
resident to asylees over a three-year period.24  
Another recent class action complaint, Ptasinska v. United States 
Department of State, similarly challenged the government’s 
administration of a yearly immigration quota.25 Congress dictates the 
number of individuals who may, each year, receive an immigrant 
(legal permanent resident) visa.26 The class action complaint alleged, 
inter alia, that the immigration service hoarded visa numbers allowed 
by Congress.27 Soon after the complaint was filed and as further 
litigation loomed, the government relented and accepted additional 
applications for legal permanent resident status.28 
As far as challenges related to removal, class actions have 
challenged detention procedures and other removal-related 
procedures.29 In Ali v. Ashcroft, a class challenged the government’s 
 
 22. Ngwanyia v. Ashcroft, No. 02-502 (D. Minn. Feb. 12, 2004).  
 23. Ngwanyia v. Ashcroft, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1081 (D. Minn. 2004), vacated, 376 F. 
Supp. 2d 923 (D. Minn. 2005).  
 24. Ngwanyia v. Gonzales, 376 F. Supp. 2d 923, 927 (D. Minn. 2005). 
 25. Complaint, Ptasinska v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 07-CV-03795 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 
 26. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151–1153 (2000). The Department of State helps to administer the 
doling out of visa numbers by issuing a monthly visa bulletin that signals when any visa 
numbers are available. In June 2007, the Department of State issued a visa bulletin indicating 
that visa numbers would be available in July. Visa Bulletin for July 2007 (June 12, 2007), 
available at http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/bulletin/bulletin_3258.html. Individuals relied on 
this information and submitted applications for legal permanent residence. On July 2, 2007, 
however, the Department of State reversed course and issued an update to the July visa bulletin. 
Update on July Visa Eligibility (July 2, 2007), available at http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/ 
bulletin/bulletin_3266.html. This July update stated that, in fact, no visa numbers were 
available. 
 27. Complaint, Ptasinska v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 07-CU-O 3795 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 
 28. American Immigration Law Foundation, AILF Welcomes Government Reversal on 
Permanent Resident Applications (“Green Cards”), July 19, 2007, http://www.ailf.org/lac/ 
lac_lit_visab.shtml. 
 29. See, e.g., I.N.S. v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, 502 U.S. 183 (1991) (upholding, 
in response to a class action, forbidding employment as a condition of immigration bond); 
Barahona-Gomez v. Reno, 167 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming preliminary injunction in a 
class action challenging numerical limits on the number of suspensions of deportation permitted 
each year); Turkmen v. Ashcroft, No. 02-CV-2307, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14537 (E.D. N.Y. 
July 29, 2004) (addressing discovery issues in a class action challenging post-September 11 
detention of foreign nationals); Kazarov v. Achim, No. 02-C-5097, 2003 WL 22956006 (N.D. 
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enforcement policy of removing individuals to Somalia even though 
the country had no functioning government.30 The detention of 
juveniles was the object of a class challenge in Reno v. Flores,31 as 
was the detention of Mariel Cubans in Fernandez-Roque v. Smith.32  
These class actions, and others like them, are litigated against a 
framework of immigration decision-making that is designed around 
individual cases. Before exploring threats to the existence of these 
class actions, a brief review of the individual process is necessary.  
The immigration services located within the Department of 
Homeland Security are divided into benefit and enforcement units.33 
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) is 
charged with administering immigration benefits.34 USCIS receives 
applications for particular immigration benefits, including 
applications for a particular legal immigration status (legal permanent 
resident status, for example), based on congressionally determined 
criteria, such as a qualifying family or employment relationship.35 
This branch of the immigration service also receives applications for 
naturalization and affirmative asylum applications.36 Among other 
duties, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) 
is responsible for the interior enforcement of the immigration laws, 
and United States Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) patrols 
 
Ill. Dec. 12, 2003) (certifying class challenging detention of those ordered but not yet removed 
from the United States); Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming certification 
of class challenging the immigration service’s procedures in obtaining waivers of a right to a 
hearing in removal proceedings and also affirming that those procedures violated notions of due 
process); Perez-Funez v. I.N.S., 611 F. Supp. 990 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (certifying class and 
granting preliminary injunction to class challenging the immigration service practice of 
obtaining waiver of a right to a hearing from unaccompanied minor foreign nationals). 
 30. Ali v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2003), withdrawn, 421 F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 
2005). 
 31. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993) (addressing a class action challenging detention 
of juveniles, the Supreme Court determined that the immigration service had not violated due 
process standards). 
 32. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 91 F.R.D. 117 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (certifying class 
challenging detention of Mariel Cubans). 
 33. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 3 (2005). 
 34. Id. at 3–4. 
 35. Id.; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151–53 (2000). 
 36. LEGOMSKY, supra note 33, at 3. Foreign nationals in removal proceedings may apply 
for certain benefits before an immigration judge, an employee of the Department of Justice. Id. 
at 639–40; 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A) (2000); 8 C.F.R. § 1245.2(a)(1) (2007). 
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the nation’s borders and ports of entry.37 While USCIS doles out 
benefits and oversees admission,38 ICE charges foreign nationals with 
removal (based on deportability or inadmissibility), represents the 
government in removal proceedings that take place within the 
Department of Justice, and oversees expulsion.39  
The adjudication process governing an application for an 
immigration benefit revolves around an individual application. 
USCIS adjudicates the application for an immigration benefit, such as 
legal permanent resident status.40 If the application is denied, there 
may be an opportunity to appeal the decision to the Administrative 
Appeals Office, which is located within USCIS.41 From there, there 
may be judicial review of the decision, depending on the nature of the 
decision being appealed and the applicability of major jurisdiction-
stripping legislation discussed below.42  
The adjudication process governing an attempt to remove a 
foreign national from the United States is also focused on the 
individual. An individual in removal proceedings faces a process 
housed within the executive branch that is designed to render a 
decision as to whether that individual may remain in the United 
States.43 Proceedings commence when the government issues a 
charging document to a foreign national and that document is filed 
with the immigration court.44 An immigration judge, an executive 
branch employee located within the Department of Justice, 
determines whether the individual is removable from the United 
 
 37. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE Operations, http://www.ice.gov/ 
about/operations.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2008); U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Mission 
Statement, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/toolbox/about/mission/guardians.xml (last visited Mar. 
22, 2008). 
 38. See supra note 33. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, an admission refers to 
a lawful entry. “The terms ‘admission’ and ‘admitted’ mean, with respect to an alien, the lawful 
entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration 
officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2000).  
 39. LEGOMSKY, supra note 33, at 635, 639. 
 40. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 204.1 (2007). 
 41. Department of Homeland Security, Delegation to the Bureau of Citizenship and 
Immigration Services, Delegation 0150.1 (Mar. 1, 2003) (granting authority “to exercise 
appellate jurisdiction over the matters described in 8 C.F.R. § 103.1(f)(3)(E)(iii) (as in effect on 
February 28, 2003)”). 
 42. See infra Part III.A. 
 43. LEGOMSKY, supra note 33, at 639–42. 
 44. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a) (2007). 
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States under the immigration statutes.45 The immigration judge 
reaches this determination after a hearing where both the government 
and the foreign national, only represented by counsel if he or she 
provides her own, present testimony and evidence.46  
There is an opportunity to appeal the immigration judge’s decision 
to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”), also located within 
the Department of Justice.47 The Board renders the final executive 
branch order. There may be limited judicial review of the final order 
by the federal judiciary depending on the application of the 
jurisdiction-stripping legislation discussed below.48 An individual 
wishing to challenge the final executive order accesses the federal 
courts by filing a petition for review in the appropriate federal court 
of appeals.49  
As the above examples illustrate, immigration litigants have used 
the class action format to supplement opportunities for individual 
litigation. The remainder of this Article reveals that there are several 
threats to the future of the immigration class action.  
III. THREATS TO THE FUTURE OF THE IMMIGRATION CLASS ACTION 
This part presents the growing impediments to the immigration 
class action. It discusses the three threats to the future of the 
immigration class action introduced above: (1) a general 
congressional willingness to restrict immigration judicial review; (2) 
the application of waivers of judicial review to immigration law; and 
(3) legislative jurisdiction-stripping attacks more specific to the 
immigration class action. As discussed above, this Article focuses on 
the implications of these threats for class actions.  
 
 45. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10 (2007); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.37 (2007).  
 46. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.16 (2007).  
 47. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2007); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3 (2007). 
 48. See infra Part III.A. 
 49. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (2000). 
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A. Threat One: Congressional Willingness to Restrict Immigration 
Judicial Review 
Congress considers proposals for immigration judicial review 
waivers and for restrictions more specific to the immigration class 
action in an atmosphere that is conducive to restrictions on 
immigration judicial review. Congress has expressed a general 
willingness to limit immigration judicial review by instructing the 
courts not to review certain types of immigration cases. These 
limitations eliminate more than just individual litigation. If courts 
may not review certain administrative decisions, that prohibition 
extends to both individual and collective litigation. 
The major legislative source for these congressional restrictions is 
the Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(“IIRIRA”) as modified by the REAL ID Act.50 Under the restrictions 
against judicial review that Congress implemented through IIRIRA in 
1996 and modified in 2005 through the REAL ID Act, the role of the 
federal courts in reviewing immigration administrative action is quite 
narrow. Congress has created several categories of restrictions.  
There are restrictions based on the substance of the case, timing, and 
form. The form and timing restrictions are most relevant to a 
discussion of specific jurisdiction-stripping attacks against 
immigration class actions; the form and timing restrictions are 
therefore addressed more thoroughly under the third threat. However, 
the substantive restrictions are discussed here briefly to provide some 
flavor of the overall breadth of the restrictions, and because they also 
affect class actions by narrowing the types of substantive claims that 
may be brought via individual or collective litigation. 
The major substantive restrictions include statutory provisions: (1) 
providing that no court has jurisdiction to review certain 
discretionary actions; (2) narrowing access to the federal courts for 
those deemed removable due to commission of certain criminal acts; 
and (3) creating an extremely limited role for the federal courts in 
 
 50. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) Pub. 
L. No. 104-208, Div. C., 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 
U.S.C.) (1996); REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13 (2005). 
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reviewing expedited removal orders.51 The limitations on judicial 
review of discretionary acts and of orders based on criminal 
convictions, however, do not preclude courts from hearing related 
constitutional claims or questions of law.52 
For example, the federal courts have no jurisdiction to review the 
discretionary decision to grant a foreign national a waiver of 
inadmissibility grounds, no jurisdiction to review the discretionary 
decision to grant cancellation of removal to a foreign national who 
meets the stringent cancellation requirements, and no jurisdiction to 
review the discretionary decision of whether to adjust an individual’s 
status to legal permanent resident.53 There is judicial review, 
however, of a related constitutional claim or question of law.54 Also, 
courts do have jurisdiction over the discretionary decision to grant 
asylum.55  
Furthermore, Congress has stripped courts of jurisdiction over 
final removal orders based on a wide variety of criminal offenses, but 
jurisdiction over related constitutional claims and questions of law 
remains. Here are two examples. If an individual’s removal order is 
based on a violation of a controlled substance law of a state, federal 
law, or law of a foreign country, there is no judicial review of the 
removal order, except for related constitutional claims or questions of 
law.56 Likewise, if an individual’s removal order is based on the 
 
 51. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) (2000). See also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2000); 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(i)(2) (2000). Under expedited removal, certain foreign nationals may be removed from 
the United States without a hearing. Congress has removed federal court jurisdiction over the 
operation and implementation of the expedited removal program except for extremely narrow 
habeas corpus actions limited to determining whether the affected individual is within the class 
of persons to whom expedited removal applies. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (2000).  
 52. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2000). 
 53. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (2000). For example, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2000) governs 
cancellation of removal. It provides that if a foreign national can meet the statutory 
requirements (as applicable) relating to duration of residence, duration of status, an absence of 
certain criminal convictions, good moral character, and “exceptional and extremely unusual 
hardship” to a qualifying spouse, parent or child, the Secretary of Homeland Security may 
cancel removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) (2000) states that there is no jurisdiction to review 
“any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section . . . [8 U.S.C. § 1229b].” 
 54. The ban on judicial review presumes that the decision is, in fact, discretionary as that 
term is used in the statute. Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 345 F.3d 683, 688–92 (9th 
Cir. 2003). 
 55. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2000). 
 56. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (2000); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2000). 
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commission of an aggravated felony, there is no judicial review, 
except, for example, to check whether the underlying criminal 
offense is, in fact, an aggravated felony.57  
After IIRIRA’s jurisdiction-stripping measures took effect, 
litigation ensued and federal courts began to interpret IIRIRA’s 
provisions. For example, in I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, the Supreme Court 
determined that the 1996 statutory language, as originally drafted, did 
not contain a clear statement of intent to eliminate habeas corpus 
jurisdiction.58 Therefore, the Supreme Court sanctioned federal court 
jurisdiction over immigration cases filed under habeas corpus 
jurisdiction even if IIRIRA eliminated statutory jurisdiction over the 
same case.59 This opening for habeas actions raised the possibility of 
a habeas class action to take the place of any statutorily-barred class 
action.60 
The promise of the habeas action in general and in habeas class 
actions was short-lived, however, because Congress responded to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in St. Cyr through the REAL ID Act of 
2005. Language in the REAL ID Act aimed to clarify that the 
restrictions on judicial review implemented through IIRIRA include 
the elimination of habeas corpus jurisdiction. The jurisdiction-
stripping statutes now explicitly state that notwithstanding any habeas 
corpus provision, no court has jurisdiction to review the applicable 
administrative determination.61 Also through the REAL ID Act, 
 
 57. Henry v. Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 493 F.3d 303, 306 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (“Whether [Petitioner’s] conviction constitutes an aggravated felony presents a 
question of law within our subject matter jurisdiction over which we exercise plenary review.”). 
The term “aggravated felony” is deceptive; it is a term of art that refers to a statutory laundry 
list of offenses that Congress deemed to be aggravated felonies for immigration purposes, but 
the offense need not necessarily be aggravated or a felony. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2000). 
While the list does include murder and rape, it also includes a theft offense for which the term 
of imprisonment is one year (and term of imprisonment includes time not served). 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(A) (2000); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (2000); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B) (2000) 
(stating that “[a]ny reference to a term of imprisonment or a sentence with respect to an offense 
is deemed to include the period of incarceration or confinement ordered by a court of law 
regardless of any suspension of the imposition or execution of that imprisonment or sentence in 
whole or in part”). 
 58. I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).  
 59. Id. at 312–14.  
 60. See Jill E. Family, Another Limit on Federal Court Jurisdiction? Immigrant Access to 
Class-Wide Injunctive Relief, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 11, 37–48 (2005–2006). 
 61. E.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A)–(C) (2000). 
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Congress provided, as mentioned above, that the restrictions on 
review of certain discretionary decisions and of orders against certain 
foreign nationals with criminal convictions do not prevent courts 
from reviewing constitutional claims or questions of law.62 
IIRIRA and REAL ID are evidence of a congressional willingness 
to limit the role of the federal courts in immigration cases. Some 
evidence of the continuing vitality of such efforts can be found in the 
legislative history of the ongoing congressional debate about 
immigration reform. During legislative consideration of immigration 
reform that took place from the winter of 2005 through the summer 
of 2007, which did not result in a final bill, proposals to limit the role 
of the federal courts in immigration cases even further met with 
varying success. For example, in the 109th Congress, the House 
passed but the Senate Judiciary Committee rejected a certificate of 
reviewability requirement that would have established an additional 
hurdle to judicial review.63 Foreign nationals seeking to challenge 
their removal orders in court would first need to obtain permission to 
access the courts from a single court of appeals judge.64 The request 
for permission could be automatically denied due to inaction on the 
request within a short time frame.65 Also, as a part of the immigration 
reform debate, Congress has battled over attempts to narrow the role 
of the federal courts in reviewing naturalization determinations and 
visa revocations.66  
It is hard to measure the strength of these proposals, however, 
because, as of the time of this writing, no final immigration reform 
bill has emerged from Congress. Nevertheless, the restrictions 
implemented through IIRIRA and REAL ID, and the incorporation of 
 
 62. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13 (2005); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2007). 
 63. Jill E. Family, Stripping Judicial Review During Immigration Reform: The Certificate 
of Reviewability, 8 NEV. L.J. 499, 509-28 (2008). Proponents of the provision argued that it is 
necessary to temper the skyrocketing number of immigration cases filed in the federal courts. 
Id. at 513, 521–22. Despite restrictions on judicial review, the number of immigration cases 
filed in the federal courts has, in fact, grown astronomically. Lenni B. Benson, Making Paper 
Dolls: How Restrictions on Judicial Review and the Administrative Process Increase 
Immigration Cases in the Federal Courts, 51 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 37, 45–48 (2006–2007). 
 64. Family, supra note 63, at 509. 
 65. Id. 
 66. E.g., S. 1639, 110th Cong. § 229 (2007) (eliminating judicial review of visa 
revocations); H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. § 609(e) (2005) (narrowing district court jurisdiction over 
naturalization petitions). 
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attempts to strip judicial review into the immigration reform debate 
(judicial review, after all, is not a core facet of the immigration 
reform debate) are evidence of a congressional willingness to restrict 
the role of the federal courts in immigration cases. This willingness 
narrows the availability of the class action by restricting the scope of 
review and sets the atmosphere for further action detrimental to the 
class action. 
B. Threat Two: Waivers of Judicial Review 
1. The Threat 
In the ongoing broad war against the class action, we find another 
threat to the future of the immigration class action: the judicial 
review waiver. In the immigration context, a judicial review waiver 
means that a foreign national must waive rights to judicial review as a 
condition of obtaining an immigration benefit from the government.67 
Such waivers also threaten individual actions, but the focus here is on 
consequences for the class action.  
Class actions are generally subject to negative treatment; one need 
not look very far to find commentary critical of the class action. In 
the media, stories abound of class action lawyers as evil-doers: 
lawyers striking it rich to the detriment of class members.68 Scholars 
debate the effectiveness of the class action and weigh its 
achievements against its costs.69 Congress has weighed in on the 
issue. In 2005, Congress passed the Class Action Fairness Act, 
which, inter alia, expanded federal court diversity jurisdiction to 
allow for more class action lawsuits to be brought in federal court.70 
 
 67. See, e.g., infra notes 93–101 and accompanying text. 
 68. See, e.g., Julie Creswell, New Blow to a Law Firm Under Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES at C13 
(Feb. 1, 2007) (describing indictment of Milberg Weiss and two partners charging that the firm 
made secret kickback payments to class action representative plaintiffs); Lynnley Browning, 
Class Action Suits Mean Delays, and Maybe, Cash, N.Y. TIMES at C9 (Jan. 12, 2003) 
(“Usually, the lawyers who bring the suits stand to gain the most.”). 
 69. See Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of 
the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 373–75 (2005) (discussing scholarly 
criticism of the class action); Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the 
Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 34–35 (2000) (same). 
 70. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2. 
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It also passed, over a Presidential veto, the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995.71 This Act, containing one title called 
“Reduction of Abusive Litigation” and another called “Reduction of 
Coercive Settlements,” imposed additional requirements on plaintiffs 
conducting private securities law class action litigation.72 At the very 
least, there exists a sense in Congress that class actions are potentially 
destructive, if not inherently abusive, and must be closely monitored. 
Such a sense and its accompanying “fixes” pose a threat to all 
class actions, including immigration class actions. There is no 
guarantee that such a sense of class actions generally will be 
contained to certain types of class actions.73 To a busy legislator, it 
may be difficult to separate suspicions about more mainstream class 
actions from immigration class actions. For example, one of the 
immigration reform bills the Senate recently considered allowed for 
restricted use of the class action to challenge the validity of a 
proposed legalization program.74 One of the restrictions required a 
legalization class action to be brought in conformity with the Class 
Action Fairness Act.75 The Class Action Fairness Act shifts certain 
class action litigation from state court to federal court and also 
contains a consumer class action bill of rights.76 Its application to an 
immigration class action seems odd.77 It could be a sign, however, of 
 
 71. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 1995. 
 72. Id. 
 73. There are also negative portrayals of the immigration class action itself. For example, 
Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff has characterized one class-wide injunction 
as hindering national security. Press Release, U.S. Government Seeks to End Litigation 
Undermining Expedited Removal of Salvadorans, (Nov. 17, 2005), available at http://www. 
dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0798.shtm (describing the class-wide injunction as 
preventing “full control of our borders”); Press Release, Statement by Homeland Security 
Secretary Michael Chertoff on Blocked Senate Amendment to Improve Immigration 
Enforcement and End “Catch and Release,” (July 14, 2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ 
xnews/releases/press_release_0954.shtm (referring to the injunction as an “obstruction” and 
stating that the Department of Homeland Security “need[s] Congress to act and pass legislation 
that would free DHS from outdated injunctions so that [it] can improve enforcement”). Also, 
David Martin has described the disruptive impact of the class action from the government’s 
perspective. Martin, supra note 6, at 321–22. 
 74. See infra notes 211–17. 
 75. See infra note 217. 
 76. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2. 
 77. In addition to expanding federal diversity jurisdiction, the Class Action Fairness Act 
contains provisions which govern class action settlements, including coupon settlements and 
“zero value” settlements. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2. It also contains 
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restrictions aimed at mainstream class actions migrating to the 
immigration law sphere. The general suspicion of the class action is a 
threat to the immigration class action, and any perceived divisions 
among types of class actions may be illusory. 
The existence of any divide is of particular interest if it is true, as 
Myriam Gilles predicts, that “class actions will soon be virtually 
extinct.”78 One of the two factors Professor Gilles uses to support this 
proposition is the growth of the waiver of the right to participate in a 
class action by contract.79 These “collective action waivers” are most 
commonly associated with class actions that would arise from a 
contractual relationship.80 They are designed “to ensure that any 
claim against the corporate defendant may be asserted only in a one-
on-one, nonaggregated arbitral proceeding.”81 According to Professor 
Gilles, “the waiver is viable wherever a contractual relationship 
connects the claimant to the defendant.”82 
Maybe, then, such waivers do not pose a threat to immigration 
class actions. After all, when we talk about immigration law, we are 
not talking about agreements for cellular phone service, shrink-
wrapped software, or a terms and conditions window on our 
computer screen in eight point font that demands an “I agree” click to 
access a new version of iTunes. Immigration law is public law, of 
course. Perhaps a breath of relief may be found when Professor Gilles 
writes, “Of course, there are other civil rights cases that do not 
implicate contractual relations, including cases concerning prison 
conditions, taxation, zoning, police misconduct, and so forth 
 
settlement notice provisions which require litigants to notify certain federal and state officials of 
a pending settlement. Id.; David F. Herr & Michael C. McCarthy, The Class Action Fairness 
Act of 2005—Congress Again Wades into Complex Litigation Management Issues, 228 F.R.D. 
673, 674–75 (2005). 
 78. Gilles, supra note 69, at 375. Professor Gilles argues that the shift to arbitration 
contributes to the end of the class action. Id. at 392–93. Not all scholars agree with this 
prediction. Mark Weidemaier argues that a shift to arbitration does not necessarily dictate an 
end to aggregation. W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Arbitration and the Individuation Critique, 49 
ARIZ. L. REV. 69 (2007). 
 79. Gilles, supra note 69, at 375. 
 80. Gilles, supra note 69, at 375–76. 
 81. Gilles, supra note 69, at 375. 
 82. Gilles, supra note 69, at 413. 
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. . . .[S]uch cases are, I think, impervious to class action waivers, and 
so form an irreducible stump of class action practice.”83 
Conceivably, immigration class actions are a part of the 
“irreducible stump” and there is no real need for alarm, at least from 
the threat of waivers of judicial review rights, including the collective 
action waiver. The doctrine behind the collective action waiver in the 
context of arbitration is founded on private law principles that mesh 
arbitration law with contract law.84 Immigration law is public law, 
based on its own foundations that, at least intuitively, have nothing to 
do with private law.  
There are at least two causes of concern, however. First, the idea 
of waiving judicial review rights as a condition for immigration status 
has been implemented and both the House and the Senate have 
endorsed proposals to use the concept further.85 Second, the Supreme 
Court has characterized the relationship between the United States 
and its immigrants in language based in notions of contract law.86 
The Supreme Court has borrowed rhetoric of contract law, and 
concepts of contractual fairness, to justify exceptional judicial 
deference to Congress via the plenary power doctrine. For example, 
the Supreme Court has explained that the decision to grant lawful 
entry to a foreign national is a sovereign prerogative and is attached 
to terms and conditions that Congress sees fit to include.87 There are 
competing theories of the nature of the relationship between the 
United States and immigrants, but “immigration as contract” is a 
prevalent theory.88 As discussed below, the government has argued in 
 
 83. Gilles, supra note 69, at 420–21. Professor Gilles recognizes that some types of civil 
rights cases do implicate contractual relations and thus are susceptible to collective action 
waivers. Id. at 418–20. Professor Gilles argues that there is no doctrinal reason “why 
government entities could not avail themselves of waivers to avoid class action liability in a 
broad array of cases, including employment, housing, entitlement, and education-related class 
actions.” Id. at 420. 
 84. The business interests pushing for class action limitations and insisting on arbitration 
agreements are not the defendants in immigration class actions. The government is the relevant 
defendant in the immigration context. The government is the powerful force that would benefit 
from limits on immigration class actions and other limits on judicial review.  
 85. See infra notes 93–101. 
 86. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 87. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 88. HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING 9–12 (2006). Steve Legomsky has 
discussed several rationales behind the plenary power doctrine. Immigration Law and the 
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litigation that this sense of immigration as contract justifies 
implementation of judicial review waivers.89 In fact, according to the 
government, this theory of immigration as contract leads to the 
conclusion that these waivers are not subject to the Constitution.90 
The idea of a private law concept such as the collective action 
waiver migrating to an area of public law like immigration law may 
seem dubious.91 Immigration law addresses government action 
regarding admission and expulsion of foreign nationals and not a 
private relationship between two contracting parties. What makes this 
idea less odd than when it first appears, however, is that while 
immigration law is indeed public law, it is a strange variety of public 
law.92 When viewed through the lens of the plenary power doctrine 
and the theory that the government’s relationship to its immigrants is 
at least contractual by analogy, the idea becomes plausible and must 
be recognized as a credible threat. In fact, here are three examples of 
how judicial review waivers already exist in the immigration 
legislative sphere.  
First, to take advantage of the Visa Waiver Program (“VWP”), a 
foreign national must waive rights to judicial review. Under the 
VWP, nationals of certain pre-approved countries are permitted to 
travel to the United States without undergoing the visa application 
 
Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, supra note 2, at 261–78. One rationale Professor 
Legomsky discusses is the idea of immigrants as guests, “to whom hospitality may be 
terminated at the pleasure of the host.” Id. at 269. This idea is founded in property law notions 
and the right/privilege distinction. Id. at 269–70. See also IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY, 
supra note 2, at 314–24. Similarly, Peter Schuck describes a “classical immigration law” order 
based on “consent-based obligation,” where the government could grant or withdraw its consent 
“on the basis of arbitrary criteria and summary procedures.” Schuck, supra note 2, at 3, 47. 
Also, Gerald Neuman has analyzed the intersection between the foundations of U.S. 
immigration law and social contract theory. GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE 
CONSTITUTION 9–13 (1996). 
 89. See infra note 162. 
 90. See infra note 162. 
 91. Professor Gilles argues that collective action waivers could seep into public law areas 
where contractual relations are implicated. See supra note 83. In another context and under 
different circumstances, the Supreme Court stymied the migration of a judicial review waiver. 
In E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., the Court held that the EEOC was not a party to an 
arbitration agreement between an employer and an employee. E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 
534 U.S. 279 (2002). The agreement contained a judicial review waiver. Id. The Court held the 
EEOC was not subject to that provision and was not barred from seeking victim-specific relief. 
Id. 
 92. See infra notes 134–41. 
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process if the individual is a nonimmigrant (temporary) visitor for a 
period of ninety days or less.93 Despite that the program waives the 
need for a visa, the individual is still subject to the inadmissibility 
grounds, and the border officer at the port of entry decides whether 
the individual is eligible to enter the United States legally. The statute 
requires the individual to waive “any right” to judicial review of the 
border officer’s determination whether the individual is admissible 
into the United States.94 The individual must also waive “any right” 
to challenge any action to remove the individual from the United 
States, other than a claim for asylum.95 The form completed by those 
applying for admission under the VWP states: “WAIVER OF 
RIGHTS: I hereby waive any rights to review or appeal of a U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection officer’s determination as to my 
admissibility, or to contest, other than on the basis of an application 
for asylum, any action in deportation.”96 The condition imposed by 
the government on the foreign national is this: the government will 
waive the requirement to apply for a visa prior to travel, but the 
foreign national must waive rights to judicial review to take 
advantage of the benefit.97 While the VWP waiver does not single out 
class actions, the waiver of “any rights” threatens the right to 
participate in a class action. 
 
 93. 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a) (2000); 8 U.S.C. § 1187(c) (2000). For more information on the 
visa waiver program, see A. James Vazquez-Azpiri & Daniel C. Horne, The Doorkeeper of 
Homeland Security: Proposals for the Visa Waiver Program, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 513 
(2005). 
 94. 8 U.S.C. § 1187(b)(1) (2000); 8 U.S.C. § 1187(g) (2000). See also 8 C.F.R. 
§ 217.4(a)(1) (2007) (“Such refusal and removal shall be made at the level of the port director 
or officer-in-charge, or an officer acting in that capacity, and shall be effected without referral 
of the alien to an immigration judge for further inquiry, examination, or hearing, except that an 
alien who presents himself or herself as an applicant for admission under section 217 of the Act, 
who applies for asylum in the United States.”). 
 95. 8 U.S.C. § 1187(b)(2) (2000). See also 8 C.F.R. § 217.4(b)(1) (2007) (“Such removal 
shall be determined by the district director who has jurisdiction over the place where the alien is 
found, and shall be effected without referral of the alien to an immigration judge for a 
determination of deportability, except that an alien admitted as a Visa Waiver Pilot Program 
visitor who applies for asylum in the United States must be issued a Form I-863 for a 
proceeding in accordance with § 208.2(b)(1) and (2) of this chapter.”). 
 96. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Form I-94W 
(10/04). 
 97. Courts have upheld the judicial review waiver component of the visa waiver program. 
See infra notes 166–76 and accompanying text. 
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The second and third examples are legislative proposals endorsed 
as a part of recent congressional debate over immigration reform. The 
House and the Senate each endorsed an expansion of the concept of 
requiring a judicial review waiver as a condition of obtaining an 
immigration benefit. In December of 2005, the House passed an 
enforcement-heavy immigration reform bill.98 One provision in this 
bill would have changed the application procedure for a 
nonimmigrant (temporary) visa to require waiver of rights to judicial 
review. The endorsed bill states:  
An alien may not be issued a nonimmigrant visa unless the 
alien has waived any right—(A) to review or appeal under this 
Act of an immigration officer's determination as to the 
inadmissibility of the alien at the port of entry into the United 
States; or (B) to contest, other than on the basis of an 
application for asylum, any action for removal of the alien.99 
In May 2006, the Senate endorsed a proposal to require a waiver 
of judicial review rights as a condition to legalize one’s immigration 
status.100 Those wishing to apply for a legalization benefit called 
“deferred mandatory departure” would have had to waive rights to 
judicial review. The endorsed bill provides: 
The Secretary of Homeland Security shall require an alien to 
include with the application a waiver of rights that explains to 
the alien that, in exchange for the discretionary benefit of 
obtaining Deferred Mandatory Departure status, the alien 
agrees to waive any right to judicial review or to contest any 
removal action, other than on the basis of an application for 
asylum or restriction of removal pursuant to the provisions 
contained in section 208 or 241(b)(3), or under the Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, done at New York December 10, 
 
 98. H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. (2005). This bill did not become law. 
 99. H.R. 4437 § 806 (adding § 221(a)(3)). 
 100. S. 2611, 109th Cong. § 601(b) (2006) (adding § 245C(b)(7)(c)). This bill did not 
become law. 
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1984, or cancellation of removal pursuant to section 
240A(a).101 
Both of these endorsed proposals require the waiver of “any right” 
and thus are a threat to both individual and collective litigation. 
For the purpose of a discussion of the future of the immigration 
class action, such provisions narrow any perceived divide between 
types of class actions. If the House and Senate bills became law, the 
application form for a nonimmigrant visa and the application form for 
deferred mandatory departure status, respectively, would have made 
immigration law seem a bit more like the cellular phone service 
agreement, the shrink-wrapped computer software and the “I agree” 
terms and conditions window. If one wants iTunes, one clicks to 
agree. If one wants to receive a nonimmigrant visa or to legalize, one 
agrees to waive rights to judicial review. The application process 
under the VWP already resembles the contractual-based waivers 
commonly found in these types of transactions. 
The VWP waiver differs from those passed by the House and the 
Senate as part of immigration reform, however. The judicial review 
waiver embedded in the VWP is triggered only if a foreign national 
chooses one of two avenues of obtaining legal entry into the United 
States. A foreign national could choose to endure the lengthier route: 
to apply for a visa to travel to the United States. Therefore, there is a 
way for the foreign national to avoid the waiver.102 The objectives 
governed by the nonimmigrant visa waiver and the legalization 
waiver, however, have no waiver-free alternatives.103 
This kind of restriction on judicial review, which allows Congress 
to limit judicial review by requiring applicants for immigration 
benefits to agree in advance to the limitation, is, if valid, potentially 
 
 101. S. 2611, § 601(b) (adding § 245C(b)(7)(c)).  
 102. However, if the House-required nonimmigrant waiver became law, there would be no 
waiver-free alternative. 
 103. As discussed below, immigration really does not implicate a contractual relationship 
and courts should be wary of carrying the analogy too far. If the idea of immigration as contract 
is to be carried into the twenty-first century, however, then application of immigration as 
contract implicates a modern understanding of contracts. For example, the absence of a waiver-
free alternative raises questions about contracts of adhesion and unconscionability. Whether a 
court would hold such a waiver to be unconscionable is beyond the scope of this Article. It is 
mentioned here as an example of the types of tough questions that must be asked if the contract 
analogy continues. 
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far reaching. Drawing on the plenary power doctrine and analogizing 
immigration to contract, proponents can argue that Congress is free to 
use its plenary power to name the terms of the bargain. In cases 
challenging VWP waivers, for example, the government has argued 
that the Constitution does not apply to those waivers, as they are 
terms of a sovereign contract.104 The terms could include a blanket 
waiver of judicial review as exemplified by the VWP waiver, the 
proposed nonimmigrant visa waiver, and the proposed legalization 
waiver. Such a waiver aims to forbid participation in any type of 
legal challenge, whether a collective action or an individual action. 
Thus, such blanket waivers are a threat to the immigration class 
action. Also, the same justification could be invoked as support for a 
more narrow collective action waiver. Of course, whether such 
legislative proposals would meet political success is debatable, but 
the scope of the concept is potentially broad.  
2. Evaluating the Threat 
Placing the political viability question to the side, what about legal 
viability? This Article hopes to spark a discussion about legal 
viability by exploring the role of the contract analogy as a 
justification for immigration judicial review waivers not subject to 
the Constitution.105 To do so, it reviews the plenary power doctrine, 
which gives Congress plenary authority in the area of immigration 
law, and examines how the plenary power doctrine interacts with the 
contract analogy to create the government’s argument that mandatory 
judicial review waivers are simply terms of a sovereign contract not 
subject to the Constitution. The analysis reveals that using the 
contract analogy to justify immigration judicial review waivers 
simply stretches the analogy too far while raising serious 
constitutional questions about congressional plenary power to dictate 
the terms of legal entry. Also, the analysis reveals that the contract 
analogy is stale. 
 
 104. See infra note 162. 
 105. This Article sets aside for future discussion an evaluation of other potential challenges 
to the implementation of such waivers, including application of the due process clause, in favor 
of focusing on the government’s threshold argument that the Constitution does not apply.  
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a. The Plenary Power Doctrine 
In an 1889 opinion known as the Chinese Exclusion Case, which 
is the foundation of the plenary power doctrine, the Supreme Court 
described the power to exclude foreigners as incident to 
sovereignty.106 The Court explained that “whatever license” foreign 
nationals may obtain from the government, that license “is held at the 
will of the government, revocable at any time, at its pleasure.”107 This 
tie to sovereignty, including a vision of the relationship between the 
government and an immigrant in the commercial terms of a license, 
amounted to plenary power and led the Court to hold that 
congressional determinations in the area are “conclusive upon the 
judiciary.”108 In this opinion, the Supreme Court refused to review a 
congressional action that excluded Chinese nationals on the basis of 
race.109 The Supreme Court refused to even question Congress’ 
decision to void re-entry certificates the government had issued to 
lawful Chinese nationals living in the United States.110  
After the Chinese Exclusion Case, the Court continued to use the 
plenary power doctrine to justify its hands off approach to 
 
 106. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889). For 
a discussion of precedent leading up to the Chinese Exclusion Case, see IMMIGRATION AND THE 
JUDICIARY, supra note 2, at 180–83. For a discussion of the history of state regulation of 
immigration law preceding the Chinese Exclusion Case, see Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost 
Century of American Immigration Law (1776–1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833 (1993). 
 107. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 609.  
 108. Id. at 606. 
 109. The Court referred to the Chinese as “foreigners of a different race . . . who will not 
assimilate with us.” Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 606. For further discussion of the 
racist origins of the plenary power doctrine, see Segregation’s Last Stronghold, supra note 2; 
DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION 116–18 (2007); LEGOMSKY, supra note 33, at 
115–18; IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY, supra note 2, at 246–48; Schuck, supra note 2, at 
3–5. 
 110. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 609 (“Whether a proper consideration by our 
government of its previous laws, or a proper respect for the nation whose subjects are affected 
by its action, ought to have qualified its inhibition, and made it applicable only to persons 
departing from the country after the passage of the act, are not questions for judicial 
determination. If there be any just ground of complaint on the part of China, it must be made to 
the political department of our government, which is alone competent to act upon the subject.”). 
Chae Chan Ping left the United States for China after living in the United States from 1875–
1887. Id. at 582. He left with a certificate that, at the time of his departure, would have 
permitted his reentry into the United States even though Congress had cut off Chinese 
immigration. Id. While Chae Chan Ping was sailing back to the United States, Congress voided 
all reentry certificates like his and then refused him entry to the United States. Id.  
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immigration law.111 For example, in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 
the Court held in 1893 that plenary power also granted Congress free 
reign in the deportation context.112  
In the 1950s, the Court continued to use the plenary power 
doctrine to justify congressional actions in both the admission and 
deportation contexts. In U.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, the Court 
refused to disturb the government’s decision to deny legal entry to a 
German-born wife of a United States Citizen.113 The Court responded 
to the wife’s challenge to her permanent exclusion using language 
steeped in the notion of immigration as privilege and contract. The 
Court wrote:  
At the outset we wish to point out that an alien who seeks 
admission to this country may not do so under any claim of 
right. Admission of aliens to the United States is a privilege 
granted by the sovereign United States Government. Such 
privilege is granted to an alien only upon such terms as the 
United States shall prescribe.114  
In the process of refusing to review the government’s decision or 
the procedures the government employed, the Court brusquely stated 
that “[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due 
process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.”115 In another 
case, Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, the Court employed 
similar reasoning to find no fault with an executive branch decision 
to exclude a returning legal permanent resident and to subject him to 
indefinite detention.116  
Describing these selected cases, however, tells only part of the 
plenary power story. Since the Chinese Exclusion Case, the Court has 
 
 111. See IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY, supra note 2, at 192–211; Immigration Law 
after a Century of Plenary Power, supra note 2, at 550–60.  
 112. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
 113. U.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950). The government determined 
that her entry would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States and deemed her 
permanently excluded without holding a hearing, pursuant to a wartime statute. Id. at 539–42. 
 114. Id. at 542. 
 115. Id. at 544. 
 116. Shaughnessy v. U.S. ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). In yet another case, 
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, the Court described congressional free reign to create and apply 
substantive deportation categories. 342 U.S. 580 (1952). 
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not been consistent in its application of the plenary power doctrine. 
For example, in 1903, the Court, in Yamataya v. Fisher, applied due 
process protection, albeit weak protection, to a foreign national 
whom the government had admitted into the United States.117 Even in 
Mezei, a quintessential plenary power decision, the Court explained 
in dicta that foreign nationals who make it through the nation’s 
“gates,” legally or illegally, are subject to the due process clause.118 
Also, in 1953, the Court held in Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding that a 
returning legal permanent resident seaman did not lose due process 
protection with his temporary exit from the United States.119 In 1963 
and in 1982, the Court reaffirmed that exits of a non-extended nature 
would not strip returning legal permanent residents of due process 
protections.120 In Landon v. Plasencia, the Court recognized that it 
“has long held that an alien seeking initial admission to the United 
States requests a privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding 
his application, for the power to admit or exclude aliens is a 
sovereign prerogative,” however, “once an alien gains admission to 
our country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent 
residence, his constitutional status changes accordingly.”121 Although 
the Court has extended due process protection to certain returning 
permanent residents through these cases, it has not overruled Mezei, 
 
 117. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903). In its opinion, the Court reiterated:  
That Congress may exclude aliens of a particular race from the United States; 
prescribe the terms and conditions upon which certain classes of aliens may come to 
this country; establish regulations for sending out of the country such aliens as come 
here in violation of law; and commit the enforcement of such provisions, conditions, 
and regulations exclusively to executive officers, without judicial intervention—are 
principles firmly established by the decisions of this court.  
Id. at 97. The Court, however, also stated: “But this court has never held, nor must we now be 
understood as holding, that administrative officers, when executing the provisions of a statute 
involving the liberty of persons, may disregard the fundamental principles that inhere in ‘due 
process of law’ as understood at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.” Id. at 100. The 
Court held that a foreign national admitted into the United States is entitled to an opportunity to 
be heard in the deportation context, but also held that a meaningful opportunity had been 
afforded even though the foreign national did not speak English. Id. at 102 (“If the appellant's 
want of knowledge of the English language put her at some disadvantage in the investigation 
conducted by that officer, that was her misfortune.”). 
 118. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212. 
 119. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953).  
 120. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963); Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982). 
 121. Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 32. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 71 Family book pages.doc  8/12/2008 3:56:00 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
98 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 27:71 
 
 
which treated a returning permanent resident as an initial entrant not 
subject to the due process clause.  
The convoluted history of the plenary power doctrine has even 
further twists. In 1977, in Fiallo v. Bell, the Court, faced with the 
question as to whether Congress could discriminate on the basis of 
sex and on the basis of illegitimate birth status in defining qualifying 
familial relationships for immigration purposes, underscored “the 
limited scope of judicial inquiry into immigration legislation” and 
upheld congressional power to dictate the terms of lawful entry.122 
Significantly, the Court mentioned, in a footnote, a “limited judicial 
responsibility under the Constitution even with respect to the power 
of Congress to regulate the admission and exclusion of aliens,” thus 
rejecting the government’s argument that the issue was 
nonjusticiable.123 In his dissent, however, Justice Marshall described 
the majority’s application of its limited judicial responsibility as 
“toothless.”124  
In 1983, the Court shot down the one-House veto of 
administrative immigration action in I.N.S. v. Chadha.125 The Court 
said it was not questioning congressional plenary power over 
immigration but rather its chosen means of implementation.126 In 
2001, the Court in Nguyen v. I.N.S. applied equal protection analysis 
to a claim of sex discrimination based on differing methods of 
citizenship acquisition.127 In so doing, the Court sidestepped the issue 
 
 122. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977). Congress did not recognize the relationship 
between a U.S. Citizen father and an illegitimate child for immigration purposes while it did 
recognize the relationship between a U.S. Citizen mother and an illegitimate child. Id. at 788. 
The Court described this differing treatment as a policy question “entrusted exclusively to the 
political branches of our Government, and we have no judicial authority to substitute our 
political judgment for that of the Congress.” Id. at 798. 
 123. Id. at 795 n.5 (emphasis added). Additionally, in Kleindienst v. Mandel, the Supreme 
Court applied a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” test to the reasoning behind a 
decision to deny legal entry while acknowledging that “plenary congressional power to make 
policies and rules for exclusion of aliens has long been firmly established.” 408 U.S. 753, 769 
(1972). See also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). 
 124. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 805. 
 125. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 126. Id. at 940–41. 
 127. Tuan Anh Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53 (2001). 
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of plenary power because it determined the statute survived equal 
protection analysis anyway.128  
The Court avoided the plenary power question again in its 2001 
decision of Zadvydas v. Davis.129 It invoked the statutory 
interpretation canon of constitutional avoidance and thereby 
sidestepped the issue of whether Congress can subject individuals 
ordered deported to indefinite detention.130 The Court held that the 
statute itself did not authorize indefinite detention.131 In the opinion, 
the Court described congressional power over immigration as 
“subject to important constitutional limitations,” yet refused to 
overrule Mezei and instead reiterated the idea that due process 
protections hinge on location; those inside are protected and those 
outside are not.132  
These cases reveal that, today, the plenary power doctrine allows 
for selective application of constitutional protection. For example, 
those who have passed through the gates are protected, but those who 
are knocking on the door (unless they are seeking reentry after a non-
extended trip abroad) are at best entitled to the limited judicial 
responsibility Justice Marshall called “toothless.” Immigration law 
has advanced from its plenary power roots, but it is debatable how far 
it has advanced.  
Scholars continue to debate whether the plenary power doctrine is 
alive, dying, or dead.133 The fact that this debate is ongoing is 
surprising given the advancement of legal theory in other areas of 
public law. Scholars have persuasively demonstrated that the 
development of immigration law has not followed the same path as 
the development of other areas of public law.134 According to Peter 
 
 128. Id. at 72–73. 
 129. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
 130. Id. at 682. 
 131. Id. at 689–90. 
 132. Id. at 692–95. See Aleinikoff, supra note 2, at 373–75. In Clark v. Martinez, the Court 
extended protection against indefinite detention to those who did not legally enter, but did so on 
statutory interpretation grounds. 543 U.S. 371 (2005). More recently, the Court upheld a statute 
mandating detention during removal proceedings against a due process challenge. Demore v. 
Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003).  
 133. See supra note 2. 
 134. See, e.g., Ten More Years of Plenary Power, supra note 2; IMMIGRATION AND THE 
JUDICIARY, supra note 2, at 197, 205; The Curious Evolution, supra note 2; NEUMAN, supra 
note 88; Schuck, supra note 2.  
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Schuck, “[p]robably no other area of American law has been so 
radically insulated and divergent from those fundamental norms of 
constitutional right, administrative procedure, and judicial role that 
animate the rest of our legal system.”135 Immigration law has been 
described as a “constitutional oddity”136 and as a “neglected stepchild 
of our public law.”137 Also, it has been observed that when it comes 
to immigration law, “normal constitutional reasoning does not 
necessarily apply.”138 As treatment of other public law issues 
evolved, the Supreme Court has allowed what Schuck calls “classical 
immigration law” to hang around.139  
This classic sense of immigration law is rooted in nineteenth 
century theories of constitutional rights and the relationship between 
government and the people.140 It is an open question whether 
immigration law has or ever will catch up to “contemporary public 
law values.”141 
There are, however, well-documented cracks in the plenary power 
doctrine. As described above, even as early as the turn of the 
twentieth century the Supreme Court found ways to ameliorate the 
harsh effects of the plenary power doctrine.142 The Supreme Court 
continues to dance around the plenary power doctrine in some cases, 
but also gives it influence at other times.143 Instead of facing the issue 
of the constitutionality of the plenary power doctrine head on, the 
Court has often blunted the effect of the doctrine through various 
tactics, including use of the statutory interpretation canon of 
 
 135. Schuck, supra note 2, at 1. 
 136. Ten More Years of Plenary Power, supra note 2, at 937.  
 137. The Curious Evolution, supra note 2, at 1631. 
 138. NEUMAN, supra note 88, at 13. 
 139. Schuck, supra note 2, at 3.  
 140. Schuck, supra note 2, at 2–3. See also Annie M. Chan, Community and the 
Constitution: A Reassessment of the Roots of Immigration Law, 21 VT. L. REV. 491, 492–95 
(1996); The Curious Evolution, supra note 2, at 1632–38; NEUMAN, supra note 88, at 9–15. 
 141. Schuck, supra note 2, at 3. See also Ten More Years of Plenary Power, supra note 2, 
at 925–27; The Curious Evolution, supra note 2, at 1626–27.  
 142. See supra notes 117–32 and accompanying text.  
 143. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) (“The Government also looks 
for support to cases holding that Congress has ‘plenary power’ to create immigration law, and 
that the judicial branch must defer to executive and legislative branch decisionmaking in that 
area . . . . [b]ut that power is subject to important constitutional limitations.”); Miller v. 
Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 455–56 (1998) (stating that “judicial power over immigration and 
naturalization is extremely limited” while citing cases that affirm congressional plenary power). 
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constitutional avoidance.144 The Court has not, however, explicitly 
overruled the doctrine. Therefore, the future of the doctrine is 
uncertain, especially in the face of a changed Supreme Court that 
sends more conservative signals.145  
b. The Contract Analogy, the Plenary Power Doctrine, and 
Judicial Review Waivers 
The contract analogy shares its roots with the plenary power 
doctrine, as the Supreme Court has used the contract analogy to 
justify the plenary power doctrine.146 As Hiroshi Motomura has 
described in his work on immigration as a transition to citizenship, 
the immigration contract is not a contract per se.147 It is more the idea 
of “immigration as contract.”148 The rhetoric of contract and concepts 
of fairness developed in contract law are borrowed to describe the 
relationship between the United States and a foreign national.149 
While described in the rhetoric of contract, the relationship is not 
actually a contracted agreement.150 Under the idea of immigration as 
contract, the government’s decision to grant lawful entry is an act of 
sovereign benevolence that is accompanied by terms and conditions. 
 
 144. Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, supra note 2; 
Legomsky, supra note 33, at 230–31; The Curious Evolution, supra note 2; Immigration Law 
After a Century of Plenary Power, supra note 2. 
 145. Linda Greenhouse, In Steps Big and Small, Supreme Court Moved Right, N.Y. TIMES, 
at A1 (July 1, 2007). 
 146. MOTOMURA, supra note 88, at 9–10, 26–37, 42–43. In addition to justifying any terms 
of lawful entry, the contract analogy also allowed the government to limit the terms of its 
obligations to foreign nationals. Peter Schuck describes that under classical immigration law, 
“[t]he government’s legal obligation to aliens rested almost entirely upon the terms and 
conditions upon which its consent to their entry had been granted and to which they had at least 
implicitly agreed.” Schuck, supra note 2, at 47. 
 147. See infra note 148. 
 148. MOTOMURA, supra note 88, at 9–10, 26–37, 42–43. Professor Motomura writes that 
“contract” in this sense does not mean a formal agreement, either in the nineteenth century or 
modern sense, but rather a framework for making decisions about immigration law that “adopts 
ideas of fairness and justice often associated with contracts.” Id. at 10. Professor Motomura 
presents “immigration as contract” in combination with “immigration as affiliation” as the 
established framework for thinking about immigration in the United States. Id. at 10–11. In his 
book, Professor Motomura presents a third way to think about immigration: “immigration as 
transition.” Id. at 11. 
 149. MOTOMURA, supra note 88, at 10. 
 150. MOTOMURA, supra note 88, at 9–10, 26–37, 42–43. See also Legomsky, supra note 
33, at 500 (drawing an analogy between a deportable offense and a breach of contract). 
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Once admitted, the foreign national must keep up his or her end of 
the bargain, otherwise deportation may result.151  
The contract analogy is tied to the plenary power notion that 
immigration benefits are a privilege and that the sovereign power 
(Congress) gets to dictate whatever terms it wants in exchange for the 
immigration benefit. For example, Congress is free to engage in race 
discrimination, sex discrimination, and to detain indefinitely, among 
other things.152  
There are significant problems with this analogy. Professor 
Motomura has engaged in a thoughtful examination of the analogy’s 
shortcomings as a framework for thinking about immigration law.153 
One of the shortcomings he identified is that the idea of immigration 
as contract adopts the rhetoric of contract without the existence of 
any real contract—that the contract label “fit[s] poorly.”154 In 
discussing this shortcoming, Professor Motomura raises the issue of 
unconscionability as applied to a one-sided agreement.155 Because of 
the nature of plenary power, this immigration “contract” is like a 
contract where the party drafting the standard form agreement, the 
party with superior bargaining power, may not even be bound by the 
terms. There is no bargaining between parties and it is difficult for 
the foreign national to enforce the terms, especially if Congress 
restricts judicial review. 
Professor Motomura’s analysis critiques the idea of immigration 
as contract as a framework for thinking about the nature of 
immigration law. To use the contract analogy as a justification for the 
requirement of a judicial review waiver, however, the contract 
 
 151. MOTOMURA, supra note 88, at 9–10, 26–37, 42–43. Professor Motomura also 
discusses how the immigration as contract idea can work in a foreign national’s favor. Id. at 43–
45, 52–53, 56–57. 
 152. Chae Chang Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889); 
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Shaughnessy v. U.S. ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). 
See also Schuck, supra note 2, at 3, 47 (discussing the classical immigration law notion of 
government granting consent to enter accompanied by terms and conditions). 
 153. MOTOMURA, supra note 88, at 58–62. According to Professor Motomura, the 
framework of immigration as contract is inadequate because it is easily manipulated, because it 
concerns an “agreement” that may or may not be legally enforceable and thus adopts the 
rhetoric of contract without the existence of any real contract, and because it awkwardly applies 
a market-based concept to public law. Id. at 58–62. 
 154. MOTOMURA, supra note 88, at 60.  
 155. Id. 
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analogy would have to cross a line that should not be crossed—the 
line that distinguishes using the idea as the basis for thinking about 
the nature of the relationship from using the idea to create an actual 
immigration contract. Courts should not cross this line. The 
relationship between the government and immigrants is not actually 
contractual. Thus, there is no real immigration contract. The idea of 
immigration as contract is borrowed rhetoric and nothing more. As 
merely an analogy, it is an analogy with shortcomings. As Professor 
Motomura has described, the label does not fit.  
Also, crossing this line highlights the outdated character of the 
analogy because overextending it from analogy to an actual 
immigration contract raises questions about modern enforcement of 
an actual immigration contract. If immigration is more than just like a 
contract, is the immigration contract enforced under modern notions 
of contract law? This Article does not intend to draw conclusions 
about whether a court would enforce such a contract, but merely to 
emphasize that the analogy as originally constructed is outdated.156 
The contract analogy, developed during a different era, is rooted in 
nineteenth century notions of the authority of government and of 
private law, including contract.157 If immigration really is a contract, 
do modern notions of contract law apply? Or, do we apply nineteenth 
 
 156. Courts, when interpreting actual contracts, have recently wrestled with complex, 
modern contract issues that are intertwined with arbitration law. For example, are collective 
action waivers enforceable? Who decides—court or arbitrator? See, e.g., Buckeye Check 
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445–46 (2006) (holding that an arbitrator hears a 
challenge to an underlying contract, as opposed to a specific challenge to an arbitration 
agreement, which a court may hear); Snowden v. Checkpoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631 (4th 
Cir. 2002) (holding that an arbitration agreement containing a class action bar is not 
unconscionable where attorneys fees are available as an incentive to bring suit despite the small 
amount of individual damages); Discover Bank v. Super. Ct., 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005) 
(concluding that under California law, in some circumstances, collective action waivers in 
consumer contracts of adhesion are not enforceable); Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n ND, 693 
N.W.2d 918 (N.D. 2005) (determining that a collective action bar in an arbitration agreement is 
not unconscionable under North Dakota law). See also Dix v. ICT Group, Inc., 161 P.3d 1016 
(Wash. 2007) (refusing to enforce a forum selection clause that would have precluded collective 
actions as violating Washington public policy).  
 157. Schuck, supra note 2, at 47–53. Professor Schuck describes a movement from an 
individualistic to a communitarian legal order in immigration law. The plenary power doctrine 
is associated with the individualistic legal order that has already been replaced in other areas of 
law. Professor Shuck argues that “immigration is gradually rejoining the mainstream of our 
public law.” Id. at 90. 
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century notions of contract law? Or, does the plenary power doctrine 
excuse these contracts from any notion of established contract law? 
Another shortcoming is that this analogy is interconnected with 
the plenary power doctrine, a doctrine that has been widely criticized 
on a number of fronts, including racist origins and a shaky legal 
foundation.158 The contract analogy is tied to the plenary power 
doctrine because the analogy influences congressional power to 
dictate the terms of legal entry. These waivers are especially 
interesting because, at least in certain contexts, they raise questions at 
the core of the plenary power doctrine. They concern congressional 
power to dictate the terms of lawful entry.159 Is it the case that, as 
Justice Scalia quoted with approval in his dissenting opinion in 
McNary, “[a]n alien who seeks political rights as a member of this 
Nation can rightfully obtain them only upon terms and conditions 
specified by Congress[?]”160 
 
 158. See, e.g., Segregation’s Last Stronghold, supra note 2; KANSTROOM, supra note 109, 
at 7, 22, 63–90 (connecting ideas underlying the plenary power doctrine to slavery and to 
removal of American Indians from their lands); IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY, supra note 
2; NEUMAN, supra note 88, at 119–25. 
 159. In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court explained:  
The distinction between an alien who has effected an entry into the United States and 
one who has never entered runs throughout immigration law. . . . It is well established 
that certain constitutional protections available to persons inside the United States are 
unavailable to aliens outside of our geographic borders. . . . But once an alien enters 
the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all 
“persons” within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is 
lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent. 
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).  
 160. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., 498 U.S. 479, 503 (1991) (quoting I.N.S. v. 
Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 884 (1988)). The serious nature of this question has led the court to 
avoid directly confronting the plenary power doctrine by interpreting statutes to avoid the 
question. See, e.g., Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678. Such a tactic could be used in the context of a 
judicial review waiver. For example, the deferred mandatory departure waiver provision, if 
enacted, could and should be read as not waiving judicial review rights of those denied that 
status. The deferred mandatory departure waiver provision demands that applicants for that 
particular immigration benefit waive rights to judicial review “in exchange for the discretionary 
benefit of obtaining Deferred Mandatory Departure status.” See supra note 101. If the waiver is 
in exchange for the benefit, then the waiver may not apply to those who are denied deferred 
mandatory departure status. This one example of a narrow interpretation illustrates that 
although the goal of these waivers may be to decrease litigation, the waivers themselves will 
generate litigation. See generally Benson, supra note 63. 
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If today, at its core, legal entry is still a privilege doled out by the 
government and if such benefits are subject to the whim of 
congressional plenary power, cannot Congress dictate the terms? 
Under the classical vision of plenary power, if the judicial review 
waiver were a condition of admission, the decision to require such a 
waiver would be conclusive upon the judiciary. The cracks in the 
plenary power doctrine, however, complicate the situation and 
illustrate problems attached to using the doctrine and the contract 
analogy to justify judicial review waivers.  
The cracks in the plenary power doctrine establish that the 
Constitution does protect those inside of the United States. The 
proposed waivers, however, could apply to both those inside and 
outside of the United States. Those seeking initial lawful entry are 
outside and thus, according to the plenary power regime, have no 
constitutional protection against the terms of the sovereign contract. 
Those inside, even if inside illegally, do fall under the protection of 
the Constitution. Therefore, those foreign nationals entering into any 
type of immigration contract, if applying from inside the United 
States, would be protected by the Constitution. But, those who sign 
the contract outside of the United States face a tougher argument that 
the contract is subject to the Constitution.161 This inside/outside 
distinction theoretically means that a judicial review waiver 
contained in the contract would sometimes be subject to the 
Constitution but not at other times. A further complication is that by 
the time such a waiver is enforced, the individual may be inside the 
United States despite having been outside at the time of signing the 
contract.  
Decisions upholding waivers of judicial review under the VWP 
illustrate how such waivers implicate the plenary power doctrine and 
the analogy between immigration and contract. The government has 
argued that because immigration is a sovereign contract, no 
constitutional protections should apply when determining the validity 
of the waiver. 162  
 
 161. This distinction raises the stakes in legislative proposals that require a foreign national 
to exit the United States before legalization takes place. 
 162. Nose v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 993 F.2d 75, 79 n.7 (5th Cir. 1993) (“The Government 
maintains that Nose did not waive a constitutional right since this is merely a ‘case sounding in 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 71 Family book pages.doc  8/12/2008 3:56:00 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
106 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 27:71 
 
 
These cases reveal the continuing influence of the idea that the 
relationship between the United States and immigrants involves 
bargain, but also reveal a refusal to overextend the contract analogy. 
In discussing the VWP waiver, courts have exhibited an instinct to 
hold the foreign national to the bargain.163 For example, the Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit enforced a waiver based on reasoning 
that to do otherwise “would render the quid pro quo aspect of the 
VWP meaningless . . . ”164 Quid pro quo means one thing is given in 
exchange for the other.165 In exchange for the privilege of traveling to 
the United States without a visa, a foreign national gives up any right 
to review. 
Despite an instinct towards bargain, courts have applied the 
Constitution to these waivers despite government pleas to the 
contrary. The government has argued that these waivers are not really 
waivers of constitutional rights but instead are a term of a contract.166 
The Fifth Circuit rejected the argument and asserted its jurisdiction to 
 
contract . . . .’”); Vang v. Gonzales, No. 06-3600, 2007 WL 1580107, at *3 (6th Cir. May 31, 
2007) (“[The Government] correctly points out . . . that Petitioners’ claims regarding [the VWP] 
waiver in this case are not constitutional claims because at the time the Petitioners signed the 
waivers, they were aliens residing outside of the United States.”); Kusumoto v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, No. 98 CV 271, 1998 WL 213715 at *7 n.7 (N.D.N.Y. Apr/ 9, 1998) (“[T]he INS views 
the waiver contained in the [VWP] as a mere contract, by which the INS agrees to let the alien 
enter the country if the unadmitted alien agrees in advance to leave without a deportation 
hearing.”). 
 163. Opinions addressing the validity of the judicial review waiver clause of the VWP 
frequently contain references to the quid pro quo nature of the deal. Schmitt v. Maurer, 451 
F.3d 1092, 1093 (10th Cir. 2006) (“As part of the program, however, participants must agree to 
two conditions.”); Freeman v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1031, 1033 n.1 (9th Cir. 2006) (“In exchange 
for this procedural benefit, VWP entrants waive their right to challenge any removal 
action. . . .”); Itaeva v. I.N.S., 314 F.3d 1238, 1239 (10th Cir. 2003) (“In return for this 
streamlined procedure, the nonimmigrant agrees to waive the right to contest a removal 
order. . . .”); Wigglesworth v. I.N.S., 319 F.3d 951, 956 (7th Cir. 2003) (“In return for being 
admitted pursuant to this streamlined procedure, the alien must waive certain rights. . . .”); 
Polizio v. Jenifer, 217 F. Supp. 2d 811, 816 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (“While Petitioner may not like 
that his entry under the [VWP] came with a waiver of rights, he received the benefits of the 
[VWP]—namely, entering this country without a visa. He must now bear the consequences of 
having violated the terms of his agreement.”); McGuire v. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, 804 F. Supp. 1229, 1234 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (“Plaintiff, having received the benefits of 
the [VWP]—namely, entering this country without a visa—must now bear the consequences of 
having violated the terms of that agreement.”). 
 164. Itaeva, 314 F.3d at 1242.  
 165. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1261 (7th ed. 1999). 
 166. See supra note 162. 
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review the adequacy of the waiver under the Constitution.167 The 
Fifth Circuit explained that foreign nationals who have entered the 
United States are entitled to the protection of the due process 
clause.168 By the time the waiver was questioned, the foreign national 
was inside the United States. She had entered under the VWP, 
overstayed her authorized period of stay and found herself in removal 
proceedings.169 The court rejected the government’s contract 
argument by relying on Cleveland Board of Education v. 
Loudermill170 to explain that Congress does not define the scope of 
the due process clause and applied the knowing and voluntary 
standard to the waiver.171 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 
however, in an unpublished opinion, agreed with the government that 
these waivers are not subject to the Constitution.172 The Sixth Circuit 
held that when the waiver is completed, the foreign national has not 
yet entered the United States, even if the foreign national is 
physically inside the United States border at the time the waiver is 
enforced.173 The court explained that because a foreign national has 
no constitutional rights before entry, when the waiver is signed, such 
applicants do not waive “rights of constitutional significance.”174  
Other courts have followed the Fifth Circuit’s lead and have 
applied the knowing and voluntary standard to these waivers, but 
have not addressed whether the Constitution applies. Relying on 
precedent that due process rights may be waived, the Courts of 
Appeals for the Fourth (in an unpublished opinion) and Seventh 
Circuits have also evaluated VWP waivers under a knowing and 
voluntary standard.175 These two courts followed the Fifth Circuit’s 
consideration of factors such as the party’s background, the clarity of 
 
 167. Nose, 993 F.2d at 79. 
 168. Id. at 78. 
 169. Id. at 77. 
 170. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985). 
 171. Nose, 993 F.2d at 79 n.7 (“Implicit in this argument is the notion that Congress has the 
unbridled authority to limit the procedural devices to protect the constitutional interests which it 
creates. The Supreme Court has rejected this ‘bitter with the sweet’ approach.”). 
 172. Vang v. Gonzales, No. 06-3600, 2007 WL 1580107, at *3 (6th Cir. May 31, 2002). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Vang, 2007 WL 1580107 at *3. 
 175. See Wigglesworth v. I.N.S., 319 F.3d 951 (7th Cir. 2003) (rejecting argument that 
judicial review waiver was not knowing or intelligent); United States v. Shomade, No. 97-4172, 
1997 WL 592729 (4th Cir. Sept. 26, 1997) (same). 
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the waiver provision, and whether an attorney represented the 
party.176  
These cases are helpful to get a sense of how courts may treat 
judicial review waivers in immigration contexts other than the VWP. 
However, as described earlier, these VWP waivers of judicial review 
are fundamentally different than other types of waivers, including the 
proposed waiver in exchange for a nonimmigrant visa and the 
proposed waiver in the legalization context. The VWP waiver is a 
part of a program that allows for an easier alternative to obtain a 
temporary visit to the United States. Granted, the waiver under the 
VWP can have longstanding and serious effects. A foreign national 
entering under the VWP signs the waiver and then loses rights to 
challenge the admissibility decision and also waives rights to 
challenge a later deportation action.177 In the context of a 
nonimmigrant visa application and in the legalization context, 
however, as with other applications for benefits, there is no 
alternative process. It is an all or nothing endeavor. The foreign 
national cannot bargain for terms, nor is there any competitor who 
can supply the good or the service. The foreign national has no other 
option.178  
This analysis raises doubts about the modern vitality of the idea of 
immigration as contract as a justification for immigration judicial 
review waivers not subject to the Constitution. Immigration as 
 
 176. Nose, 993 F.2d at 79. In these three cases, each court upheld the waiver as knowing 
and voluntary. The Fifth Circuit determined that a knowing waiver existed where a nurse, a 
“highly educated person,” entered under the VWP. Id. This nurse had studied English for over 
two years and had passed an English proficiency exam. Id. The court held that the waiver was 
clear and that the nurse had consulted an attorney before she entered the United States. Id. The 
Seventh Circuit assumed that the knowing and voluntary standard applied and determined that 
waiver survived that scrutiny despite the absence of attorney consultation where the waiver was 
provided to an individual in her native language, the individual had a high school education, 
owned her own business and had traveled extensively. Wigglesworth, 319 F.3d at 959. The 
Fourth Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, rejected the argument that the waiver was not 
knowing or intelligent where the foreign national “is well-educated and has no difficulty 
reading or understanding English.” Shomade, 1997 WL 592729, at *1. See also Polizio v. 
Jenifer, 217 F. Supp. 2d 811, 815 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (rejecting argument that judicial review 
waiver under VWP was not knowing or intelligent); Tsukamoto v. Radcliffe, 29 F. Supp. 2d 
660, 662 (D. Haw. 1998) (same). 
 177. In fact, the cases addressing the adequacy of the VWP waiver cited here involve 
putative challenges to removal based upon deportability that were stymied by the waiver. 
 178. There is not even an arbitration option. 
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contract is an outdated analogy that would have to be stretched too 
far to justify such waivers. It is an idea that shares tainted roots with a 
cracked plenary power doctrine. Also, the use of the contract analogy 
to justify these waivers raises a serious constitutional question about 
congressional power over immigration law: May Congress require a 
waiver of judicial review rights as a condition for legal entry, 
eliminating all avenues of judicial review, including class actions?179 
The development of the immigration judicial review waiver is a 
threat to watch. There is no guarantee that the general war against the 
class action will not include a front against the immigration class 
action. In fact, the next threat provides evidence that the front already 
exists. 
C. Threat Three: Jurisdiction-Stripping Attacks on Immigration Class 
Actions 
The general willingness to restrict immigration judicial review 
discussed above is reflected in more specific attacks on the 
immigration class action. This section will describe an enacted 
provision that is an explicit ban on class certification. It will also 
discuss other enacted provisions whose meanings are not yet resolved 
but could be interpreted to limit class actions. These provisions 
include the timing and form restrictions added to the immigration 
statutes through IIRIRA. Finally, this section will describe legislative 
proposals that aim to narrow the availability of the immigration class 
action. 
1. Enacted Threats 
As far as form restrictions, IIRIRA added one provision that 
specifically prohibits class certification and another whose meaning 
is unresolved. Title 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(1)(B) directly attacks class 
certifications under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 in the context 
of expedited removal. It expressly instructs that “[w]ithout regard to 
 
 179. In this sense, these waivers, at least outside the context of the VWP, would effectively 
function as a jurisdiction-stripping provision. No one may seek review because everyone has 
waived the opportunity. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 71 Family book pages.doc  8/12/2008 3:56:00 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
110 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 27:71 
 
 
the nature of the action or claim and without regard to the identity of 
the party or parties bringing the action, no court may—certify a class 
under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” in any action 
for which the expedited removal statute permits judicial review.180  
Another section, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1), provides some cryptic 
language that may be a form restriction. The section may restrict the 
use of class actions in a more general immigration context.181 Section 
1252(f)(1), entitled “Limit on injunctive relief,” reads: 
Regardless of the nature of the action or claim or of the 
identity of the party or parties bringing the action, no court 
(other than the Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction or 
authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of the provisions of 
part IV of this subchapter, as amended by the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996, other than with respect to the application of such 
provisions to an individual alien against whom proceedings 
under such part have been initiated.182 
The Supreme Court has not yet directly addressed the meaning of 
this language, but it has written in dicta that this provision “prohibits 
federal courts from granting classwide injunctive relief against the 
operation of §§ 1221–1231, but specifies that this ban does not 
extend to individual cases.”183 According to this dicta, the ban is on 
“classwide injunctive relief” aimed “against the operation of” certain 
sections of the immigration statutes.184  
Elsewhere the author has argued that this interpretation of section 
1252(f)(1) is not entirely correct and that the actual effect of this 
section is narrow, but the statutory section nonetheless exists as a 
threat to the immigration class action.185 This section is like the 
 
 180. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(1)(B) (2000). 
 181. For further discussion of section 1252(f)(1), see Family, supra note 60. 
 182. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) (2000). 
 183. Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 481–82 (1999) (Scalia, 
J.). Judge Easterbrook wrote similar dicta: “[T]his enactment curtails resort to a particular 
remedy—the injunction. Subsection (f)(1) forbids injunctive class actions . . . .” Hor v. 
Gonzales, 400 F.3d 482, 483 (7th Cir. 2005). Also, David Martin describes class actions as the 
“clear target” of section 1252(f)(1). Martin, supra note 6, at 323. 
 184. Reno, 525 U.S. at 481–82. 
 185. Family, supra note 60.  
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expedited removal class action bar in that it is directed at insulating a 
portion of the immigration laws from certain court action, but in the 
case of section 1252(f)(1), the identity of the “certain court action” is 
unresolved. Just as the expedited removal class action bar only 
applies to expedited removal, section 1252(f)(1) targets injunctive 
relief relating to only a portion of the immigration laws, “part IV of 
this subchapter.” Part IV governs removal.186 As the above discussion 
of the differing functions of the immigration service suggests, the 
government does more than just remove foreign nationals.187 
Therefore, section 1252(f)(1), even if interpreted too broadly to bar 
class-wide injunctive relief, is still limited.188 The identity of the 
prohibited court action is hazier in section 1252(f)(1) than in its 
expedited removal cousin.  This is because the language of section 
1252(f)(1) forbids restraints on the operation of certain sections 
(except by the Supreme Court) “other than with respect to the 
application of such provisions to an individual alien against whom 
proceedings under such part have been initiated.” The provision does 
not mention Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 nor does it explicitly 
bar the certification of a class, which the expedited removal bar does. 
The form restriction in section 1252(f)(1) is neither the only 
section nor the only type of restriction added through IIRIRA whose 
effect on the immigration class action remains unresolved. IIRIRA 
added timing restrictions to the immigration statutes that pose a threat 
to the availability of the immigration class action. For example, 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) calls into question whether an individual may 
enlist federal court review if there is no final administrative order of 
removal, or if the individual wishes to bring an affirmative action 
against the government “arising from” removal.189 Examples of an 
 
 186. Family, supra note 60, at 31–32. 
 187. See supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text. 
 188. Family, supra note 60, at 31–32. 
 189. See Motomura, supra note 5, at 409–13. Another potential timing restriction is section 
1252(d). 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d) (2000). The section directs that “a court may review a final order 
of removal only if—the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as 
of right.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (2000). This section, like section 1252(b)(9), raises questions 
about the availability of federal court review outside of the context of the individualized hearing 
procedure. Motomura, supra note 5, at 440–43. Hiroshi Motomura argues, however, that this 
exhaustion provision should not apply to pattern and practice cases because such matters are 
independent from a “final order.” Id. at 440–41. 
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affirmative action suit include a class action challenging a detention 
practice or challenging a deficiency in the administrative procedure 
afforded. 
The provision states that all legal and factual questions “arising 
from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from 
the United States under this title shall be available only in judicial 
review of a final order under this section.”190 There are outstanding 
questions as to the meaning of section 1252(b)(9), including whether 
this restriction on timing effectively prohibits any form of action 
other than a petition for review following the individualized hearing 
process.191 If it does, it threatens to narrow the availability of the 
immigration class action to challenge removal because a class action 
does not fit within the individualized petition for review procedure.  
Hiroshi Motomura has argued persuasively that section 1252(b)(9) 
should be construed narrowly to allow for jurisdiction in the absence 
of a removal order.192 Professor Motomura argued that “some matters 
are sufficiently significant and independent of a removal proceeding 
that they should not be treated as part of the case or controversy for 
jurisdictional purposes.”193 The breadth of the reading depends on 
what it means for an action to arise from “any action taken or 
proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States.” 
Before IIRIRA and REAL ID, review of final orders of removal 
occurred in the courts of appeals.194 Review of actions collateral to 
final orders of removal, such as an action seeking a stay of removal, 
 
 190. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). The full section states:  
Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and 
application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or 
proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this title shall be 
available only in judicial review of a final order under this section. Except as otherwise 
provided in this section, no court shall have jurisdiction, by habeas corpus under 
section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, or any other habeas corpus provision, by 
section 1361 or 1651 of such title, or by any other provision of law (statutory or 
nonstatutory), to review such an order or such questions of law or fact.  
8 U.S.C. § 1252 (b)(9) (2000). 
 191. For further discussion of section 1252(b)(9), see Motomura, supra note 5, at 415–33. 
 192. See Motomura, supra note 5, at 413–14. David Martin has expressed agreement with 
this interpretation. Martin, supra note 6, at 320–21 n.30. 
 193. Motomura, supra note 5, at 414. 
 194. Motomura, supra note 5, at 415. 
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could be brought in district courts.195 Thus, before IIRIRA and REAL 
ID, courts categorized challenges into appropriate courts, considering 
whether the challenged act fell into the final order or the collateral to 
a final order category.196 After IIRIRA and REAL ID, litigants are 
successfully presenting courts with similar requests for categorization 
based in section 1252(b)(9), by arguing that certain acts do not arise 
from “any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien 
from the United States.”197 Thus, the collateral category survives.  
As this discussion reveals, threats to the immigration class action 
are both direct and indirect. The Supreme Court has shown 
reluctance, however, to interpret potential indirect attacks broadly. 
The 1986 legalization statute contained a special judicial review 
provision that provided for judicial review of “a determination 
respecting an application [for legalization]” only in the context of 
review of an individual deportation order in the appropriate court of 
appeals.198 As the immigration service administered the legalization 
 
 195. Motomura, supra note 5, at 415–16. 
 196. Id. 
 197. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) (2000). See, e.g., Singh v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 969, 979 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (determining that an ineffective assistance claim aimed at a lawyer’s post final 
removal order conduct did not fall under section 1252(b)(9)); Madu v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 470 
F.3d 1362, 1367 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that an argument that a foreign national is not subject 
to a removal order is not the same as challenging a removal order); Kumarasamy v. Attorney 
Gen., 453 F.3d 169, 172 (3d Cir. 2006) (same but in the context of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5)); 
Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1075–76 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that a detention 
challenge was not a challenge to a final order of removal); Hernandez v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 42, 
42–43 (1st Cir. 2005) (determining, in the context of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5), that a detention 
challenge is independent of a removal challenge); Turkmen v. Ashcroft, No. 02-CV-2307, 2006 
WL 1662663, *25–26 (E.D.N.Y. June 14, 2006) (categorizing actions as arising from and not 
arising from a removal order); Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 268–70 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(holding detention-related challenges to be collateral to a removal order); Singh v. Chertoff, No. 
C05-1454, 2005 WL 2043044, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2005) (determining that a decision to 
revoke asylum status falls outside of section 1252(b)(9)). But see, e.g., Mancho v. Chertoff, 480 
F. Supp. 2d 160, 162 (D.D.C. 2007) (holding that a petition for attorneys fees under the Equal 
Access to Justice Act did arise from a removal order). See also Aguilar v. U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement, 510 F.3d 1, 11, 13–14, 18–19 (1st Cir. 2007) (reading “arising from” to 
“exclude claims that are independent of, or wholly collateral to, the removal process [including] 
claims that cannot effectively be handled through the available administrative process” and 
categorizing a right to counsel claim as not collateral while categorizing a substantive due 
process claim (right to family integrity) as collateral). 
 198. 8 U.S.C. § 1160(e)(1) (2000) (“There shall be no administrative or judicial review of a 
determination respecting an application [for legalization] except in accordance with this 
subsection.”); 8 U.S.C. § 1160(e)(3) (“There shall be judicial review of such a denial only in the 
judicial review of an order of exclusion or deportation . . . .”). For more information about the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 71 Family book pages.doc  8/12/2008 3:56:00 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
114 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 27:71 
 
 
program, however, aggrieved applicants filed pre-deportation order 
pattern and practice lawsuits in district court. For example, in 
McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., a class sought to challenge 
practices and policies the immigration service implemented as a part 
of the legalization program.199 This pattern and practice case was not 
a reactive response to an individual deportation order. The 
government argued that the district court did not have jurisdiction 
over such a pre-final order lawsuit. The government interpreted the 
special judicial review provision to bar any challenge outside of the 
context of review of an individual deportation order.200 
The Supreme Court determined that the special judicial review 
provisions did not preclude federal district court jurisdiction over pre-
deportation order pattern and practice class actions challenging the 
administration of the legalization program.201 The Supreme Court 
read the judicial review provision narrowly. Specifically, it held that 
the provision did not prevent “general collateral challenges to 
unconstitutional practices and policies used by the agency in 
processing applications.”202 The Court had a textual basis for the 
narrow reading,203 but it also concluded that to deny district court 
review of pattern and practice collateral challenges would be the 
“practical equivalent of a total denial of judicial review of generic 
constitutional and statutory claims” because of the nature of the 
legalization program and the structure of judicial review.204 To avoid 
 
legalization special judicial review provisions, see Daniel Kanstroom, Judicial Review of 
Amnesty Denials: Must Aliens Bet Their Lives to Get into Court?, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
53 (1990). 
 199. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., 498 U.S. 479 (1991).  
 200. Id. at 483, 491–92. 
 201. Id. at 483.  
 202. Id. at 492. 
 203. The special judicial review provision applied to “judicial review of a determination 
respecting [a legalization] application.” The Court concluded, “a ‘determination’ describes a 
single act rather than a group of decisions or a practice or procedure employed in making 
decisions.” Id. at 492. Therefore, the statue did not apply to “general collateral challenges to 
unconstitutional practices and policies.” Id.  
 204. Id. at 497. A denied application for legalization did not automatically lead to a 
deportation proceeding because of confidentiality firewalls built into the application process. 
Since applicants would face deportation if not for the legalization program, the legalization 
statute shielded applicants with a firewall prohibiting the use of information garnered in the 
application process to deport the applicant. 8 U.S.C. § 1255a (c)(5) (2000); 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1160(b)(6) (2000). A decision to deny a legalization application could be administratively 
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such an outcome, the Court interpreted the statute to allow for the 
class action to proceed. 
The Court had an opportunity to revisit the principles of its 
McNary decision in a legalization class action that challenged the 
immigration agency’s interpretation of a statutory provision.205 In 
Reno v. Catholic Social Services, the Court reiterated its holding in 
McNary that the special judicial review provision did not bar review, 
but it also held that justiciability considerations blocked district court 
jurisdiction in that particular case.206 The Court reaffirmed its concern 
about the lack of an opportunity to present certain challenges in the 
context of review of an individual hearing. In Catholic Social 
Services, the Court was not concerned, at least about certain class 
members, because it determined those class members could challenge 
the appropriateness of the regulation at issue in the context of review 
of an individual case.207 The Court distinguished the McNary class 
 
appealed to a legalization appeals unit. 8 U.S.C. § 1255a (f)(3) (2000); 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1160(e)(2)(A) (2000). Because of the firewall, however, a legalization appeals unit denial did 
not automatically place an individual in deportation proceedings. This protection presented a 
Catch-22 to individuals who desired federal court review of a legalization appeals unit denial. 
As explained above, the legalization special review provision permitted judicial review of a 
decision of the legalization appeals unit “only in the judicial review of an order of exclusion or 
deportation.” 8 U.S.C. § 1160(e)(3). As explained by the Supreme Court, “absent initiation of a 
deportation proceeding against an unsuccessful applicant, judicial review of such individual 
determinations was completely foreclosed.” McNary, 498 U.S. at 486. Therefore, a foreign 
national could be stuck in limbo with no way to access court review. The applicant cannot 
challenge the legalization determination until deportation proceedings terminated, but there may 
never be a deportation hearing or it may not occur for quite some time.  
 Also, the Court identified a bar to the assertion of constitutional and statutory claims other 
than this limbo element. Even if a foreign national were to subject himself or herself to a 
deportation proceeding, and then were to seek judicial review, the Court concluded that the 
reviewing court of appeals would be in a poor position to adjudicate constitutional pattern and 
practice claims based on the administrative record of an individual legalization application. Id. 
at 497; see also Tefel v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 608, 615 (S.D. Fla. 1997), vacated on other 
grounds, 180 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 1999) (following McNary, the court discussed the need for 
district court review of claims for which an adequate record is not created during the 
administrative process). The Court acknowledged that a court of appeals would not have the 
fact-finding powers to determine whether a pattern of unlawful practice was occurring in the 
context of an individual case. McNary, 498 U.S. at 497. Additionally, if limited to post-final 
order judicial review, the applicant would be limited to rely on the administrative record and, in 
McNary, the claimants argued that the procedure in creating the administrative record was 
constitutionally flawed. Id. at 496. 
 205. Reno v. Catholic Soc. Serv., 509 U.S. 43 (1993). 
 206. Id. at 59–60. 
 207. The Court reasoned that each class members’ claim would not ripen until the 
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members from the Catholic Social Services class because the McNary 
class members could not adequately present their pattern or practice 
challenge in the context of an individual hearing.208  
McNary exemplifies a reluctance by the Court to interpret a less 
than explicit statute to preclude an affirmative class action, at least 
where the absence of the action would effectively preclude judicial 
review. The resolution of the exact effect of the indirect threats 
described here remains.  
2. Proposed New Threats 
IIRIRA provides evidence of a general desire to limit judicial 
review in the immigration context and contains more specific threats 
to the immigration class action, including an explicit ban on the use 
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and other provisions whose 
effect remains uncertain.209 The enacted threats may foreshadow 
further legislative limits aimed specifically at immigration class 
actions. Currently floating around Congress are legislative attempts 
to bar immigration class actions further and to decrease the 
effectiveness of the immigration class action by narrowing the ability 
of the federal courts to fashion immigration prospective relief.  
In 2006 and in 2007, immigration reform provisions that would 
limit the use of the class action appeared in bills and in proposed 
amendments. These provisions vary from a proposed outright ban on 
class certifications regarding anything that has anything to do with 
immigration law (the ultimate form restriction) to provisions that 
explicitly demarcate the availability of the class action but only under 
specific timing and geographic restrictions.210 
 
immigration agency applied the objectionable regulation to each individual. Reno, 509 U.S. at 
59–61. At that point, the individual would be challenging “a determination” and such a 
challenge would activate the special judicial review procedures. Id. at 59–61. The Court held 
there would be district court jurisdiction for certain class members who could not bring their 
claim in the context of an individual hearing. Id. at 61–64. 
 208. Id. at 60–61. 
 209. See supra Part III.A; Part III.C.1. 
 210. Also, there are proposed limits on the availability of the class action to challenge 
government action under the proposed Employment Eligibility Verification System (“EEVS”). 
S. 1639, 110th Cong. § 302 (2007). With regard to challenges to nonconfirmation notices and 
the enforcement of penalties for noncompliance, the bill would place limits on injunctive relief 
similar to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1). S. 1639, 110th Cong. § 302 (2007). Also, certifications under 
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One example of a bill containing restricted use of the class action 
is Senate Bill 1639, the second incarnation of immigration reform in 
the 110th Congress.  This bill contains specific provisions governing 
judicial review of a legalization determination.211 The bill provides 
that judicial review of a legalization denial would be available “only 
in conjunction with the judicial review of an order of removal”; yet, it 
would also prohibit review of discretionary actions and limit review 
to the administrative record of the denial.212 Perhaps acknowledging 
the jurisdictional quandary presented in McNary, the bill contains a 
separate provision governing “challenges on validity of the 
system.”213 According to this provision, the following type of claim 
may be brought, but only in the District Court for the District of 
Columbia: 
Any claim that title VI214 of [this Act], or any regulation, 
written policy, or written directive issued or unwritten policy 
or practice initiated by or under the authority of the Secretary 
of Homeland Security to implement that title, violates the 
Constitution of the United States or is otherwise in violation of 
law.215  
In addition to this geographic restriction, there are timing 
restrictions.216 Class actions would be permitted, but the action must 
conform to time and geographical limitations and with the Class 
Action Fairness Act.217 Class actions would not be eliminated, but 
would be restricted. 
 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 would be barred as a means of challenging the validity of 
the EEVS. Id. 
 211. S. 1639, 110th Cong. § 603(c) (2007). 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id.  
 214. Title VI contains the legalization provisions. 
 215. S. 1639, 110th Cong. § 603(c) (2007).  
 216. Such actions must be filed within one year after the publication or promulgation date 
of the challenged regulation, policy or directive. Id. Challenges to unwritten policies or 
practices must be filed within a year after “the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known 
of the unwritten policy or practice.” Id. Actions challenging the validity of the Act itself must 
be brought within one year of the Act’s enactment. Id. 
 217. Id. Senator Sessions, however, filed an amendment to S. 1639 that would have 
provided for no review of legalization determinations. See Senate Amendment 1890 of S. 1639 
(submitted 2007) (“a denial, termination or rescission of benefits or status under this title [the 
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One legislative proposal containing an outright attempt to ban 
immigration class actions can be found in an amendment Senator 
John Cornyn submitted, but was not considered, as a part of the 
immigration reform debate in the 110th Congress in 2007. The 
proposed amendment would have prohibited any court from 
certifying a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 “in any 
civil action filed after the date of the enactment of this Act pertaining 
to the administration or enforcement of the immigration laws of the 
United States.”218 It is hard to imagine a broader form attack on the 
immigration class action. 
This same 2007 amendment also would have diminished the 
effectiveness of a class action, even if the form were to survive, by 
severely limiting prospective relief in immigration cases; it is a form 
restriction in disguise.219 Senator Cornyn has pushed previously and 
consistently for these limits on prospective relief. For example, the 
Senate endorsed these restrictions on prospective relief by including 
the “Fairness in Immigration Litigation Act of 2006” as a part of the 
immigration reform bill the Senate passed in May 2006.220 If it had 
been enacted, this Act would have instituted a myriad of restrictions 
on prospective relief in immigration cases. The Act would have 
handcuffed federal judges in terms of the breadth and duration of 
prospective relief.221 It would have set a default date for the 
expiration of preliminary injunctive relief of ninety days.222 It also 
would have turned a government motion to modify or terminate an 
order granting prospective relief into a trigger for an automatic stay 
of the relief.223 These provisions would have also applied to private 
 
legalization program] may not be reviewed by any court, and no court shall have jurisdiction to 
hear any claim arising from, or any challenge to, such denial, termination or rescission.”). 
 218. Senate Amendment 1209 of S. 1348 (submitted 2007). 
 219. Id. 
 220. S. 2611, 109th Cong. §§ 421, 422 (2006).  
 221. The legislation provides that when ordering prospective relief a court “shall,” among 
other things, “limit the relief to the minimum necessary to correct the violation of law,” “adopt 
the least intrusive means to correct the violation of law,” “minimize, to the greatest extent 
practicable, the adverse impact on national security, border security, immigration administration 
and enforcement, and public safety” and “provide for the expiration of relief on a specific date, 
which is not later than the earliest date necessary for the Government to remedy the violation.” 
S. 2611, 109th Cong. § 422(a)(1)(A)–(D). 
 222. S. 2611, 109th Cong. § 422(a)(3). 
 223. The bill reads:  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol27/iss1/5
p 71 Family book pages.doc  8/12/2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008]  Immigration Class Actions 119 
 
 
settlement agreements subject to judicial enforcement and consent 
decrees that require court approval.224 
Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff has referenced 
one ongoing immigration class action, originally captioned Orantes-
Hernandez v. Meese, as the motivation behind immigration injunction 
reform.225 According to Secretary Chertoff, this “20-year-old court 
order” is “the burden of what we call the Orantes Injunction.”226 The 
injunction ordered the government to correct due process violations 
that hindered El Salvadorans from applying for asylum. The Orantes 
injunction, from the government’s perspective, ties the hands of 
immigration enforcement from swiftly removing Salvadorans 
apprehended at the border.227 Opponents of Senator Cornyn’s 
injunction reform have argued that the Orantes injunction does not 
hinder the immigration enforcement efforts cited by Secretary 
Chertoff.228 In 2005, the government filed a motion to dissolve the 
Orantes injunction while it simultaneously sought a legislative fix via 
 
The Government’s motion to vacate, modify, dissolve, or otherwise terminate an order 
granting prospective relief made in any civil action pertaining to the administration or 
enforcement of the immigration laws of the United States shall automatically, and 
without further order of the court, stay the order granting prospective relief on the date 
that is 15 days after the date on which such motion is filed unless the court previously 
has granted or denied the government’s motion. 
S. 2611, 109th Cong. § 422(b)(2). 
 224. S. 2611, 109th Cong. § 422(c). 
 225. Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488 (C.D. Cal. 1988), aff’d sub. nom., 
919 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 226. Press Release, Remarks by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff (July 14, 
2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0953.shtm. 
 227. Secretary Chertoff stated:  
It’s really simple. If we want to control the border and if we want to complete the task 
of ending catch-and-release, and going to catch-and-remove, we have to untie the 
hands of the Border Patrol. And right now, the Border Patrol has its hands tied by rope 
that was tied 20 years ago, for a reason that no longer exists. So as a matter of common 
sense, we ought to be able to cut the cord here and let the Border Patrol do the job that 
we want them to do. 
Id. 
 228. See National Immigration Law Center, The Orantes Injunction and Expedited 
Removal, 20 IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS UPDATE 4, (Aug. 23, 2006), available at http://www.nilc. 
org/immlawpolicy/removpsds/removpsds152. 
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Senator Cornyn’s proposal. A district court judge upheld the 
injunction in July 2007.229 
Although the May 2006 Senate immigration bill did not become 
law, Senator Cornyn continued to push his proposal to limit relief. 
There was a failed attempt to add the Fairness in Immigration 
Litigation Act to a pending Department of Homeland Security 
Appropriations Act in July 2006.230 A few months later, House 
Republicans publicized a “September ‘Border Security Now’ 
Agenda.”231 This ten item agenda included the Fairness in 
Immigration Litigation Act.232 The House endorsed the substantive 
provisions affecting prospective relief of the Fairness in Immigration 
Litigation Act as a part of this September push.233 The Senate did not, 
however. Also, as explained above, Senator Cornyn submitted an 
amendment in 2007 that would have implemented these limits. 
These restrictions and proposals send a message that the 
immigration class action is under threat. Sometimes this message is 
manifested in the form of an outright ban on forming a class under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Other times the message is 
indirect, manifested in vague restrictions on form, timing, or on the 
issuance of prospective relief. While perhaps vague, the message is 
no less serious. For example, prospective relief is the lifeblood of the 
immigration class action. These are actions challenging the 
government’s behavior. These actions seek change in that behavior, 
such as implementation of different procedures, to meet 
constitutional requirements. The restrictions on prospective relief are 
no doubt meant to discourage the filing of class actions. Under this 
type of restriction, the availability of the class action format is 
 
 229. Orantes-Hernandez v. Gonzales, No. CV 82-01107, Amended Order Granting in Part 
and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion to Dissolve the Orantes Injunction (July 26, 2007); 
District Court Preserves Most of Orantes Injunction, 84 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1786 (Aug. 6, 
2007). The judge did modify the injunction to reflect political condition changes in El Salvador. 
 230. Senator Cornyn introduced amendment number 4577 to H.R. 5441, 109th Cong. 
(2007) that the chair ruled as out of order on July 12, 2006. 
 231. House Republican Border Security Bulletin, September 14, 2006 (on file with author). 
 232. House Republican Border Security Bulletin, September 14, 2006 (stating that the 
Fairness in Immigration Litigation Act would end “outdated injunctions that prevent the 
effective enforcement of immigration laws”). 
 233. H.R. 6095, 109th Cong. § 301 (2006). 
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seemingly left intact, but the restrictions neuter the promise of the 
class action by narrowing the available relief. 
IV. CONCLUSION  
Examining the very limited role of the federal courts in 
immigration law with a focus on the class action uncovers threats to 
the future of the immigration class action. These hazards may have 
implications for both individual and collective action, but a focus on 
the implications for collective action reveals that the immigration 
class action, a form of action that litigants have used to challenge 
widespread misadministration of the immigration laws, is under 
threat. 
Congress has exhibited a willingness to curtail immigration 
judicial review. That willingness negatively affects class actions by 
shrinking the pool of administrative action available for judicial 
review by class action or otherwise. Congress’ curtailing actions also 
create a legislative atmosphere conducive to further restrictions on 
the role of the federal courts in immigration law, including the 
adoption of judicial review waivers as a requirement to obtain an 
immigration benefit and more specific restrictions that implicate the 
immigration class action.  
There are signs that the trend in favor of waivers of court access 
increasingly prevalent in private law poses a threat to immigration 
judicial review. These immigration waivers would affect both 
individual actions and class actions by requiring waiver of rights to 
judicial review as a condition of obtaining an immigration benefit. 
The government has argued in litigation that these waivers are not 
subject to the Constitution, that they are terms of a sovereign 
contract. This Article concludes that the government’s argument 
overextends an expired analogy of immigration law as contract law 
developed in the nineteenth century, and raises serious constitutional 
questions about congressional power.  
In addition to an explicit limit on the formation of a class in one 
immigration context, Congress has also enacted provisions whose 
meanings are not yet resolved but pose a threat to the future of the 
immigration class action. Adding to the uncertainty are recent 
congressional proposals that would either expand the explicit ban on 
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the formation of a class to other immigration contexts, or would 
neuter such actions by imposing severe restrictions on prospective 
relief. 
This collection of threats calls out for further study of the 
immigration class action. We should know more about what may be 
lost. 
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